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INTEGRATING “ALTERNATIVE” DISPUTE
RESOLUTION INTO BANKRUPTCY:
AS SIMPLE (AND PURE) AS
MOTHERHOOD AND APPLE PIE?
Nancy A. Welsh*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, there can be little doubt that “alternative” dispute resolution is any-
thing but alternative.  Courts, public agencies, and private companies have
embraced, and now regularly use, a wide range of dispute resolution proce-
dures, such as arbitration, mediation, negotiation, med-arb, early neutral evalu-
ation, and summary jury trial, to name just a few.  Indeed, current empirical
data regarding the disposition of litigated matters indicates that trial may be
among the most “alternative” of the various procedures available to resolve
disputes.1  Even law schools, which often lag behind developments in legal
practice and model much of their curriculum on trial and appellate advocacy,
now generally offer specialized dispute resolution courses.  Moreover, law
schools increasingly are incorporating dispute resolution procedures and skills
into many traditional doctrinal courses.2  Meanwhile, the plethora of available
* Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law.  My thanks to Laurel
Terry, Mark Desgrosseilliers, Art Hinshaw, Marie Reilly, William Woodward, Nancy
Rapoport and the Hon. Samuel Bufford for their comments during the development of this
Article and to the participants at the Conference on Conflict Resolution and the Economic
Crisis, held at the William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas.  My
thanks as well to Jean Sternlight for the invitation to participate in the Conference, David
Brown for his excellent research assistance throughout, Nicole Kalis for her assistance with
parts of the Article, and Kelly Towns and Carolina Aguilar, upon whose initial research this
Article continues to build.  Any mistakes are, of course, my own.
1 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 12 (2006)
(“When the federal rules of civil procedure were enacted in 1938, about 18 percent of civil
cases in federal court were resolved by trial.  That figure fell to about 12 percent in 1962 and
today it is 1.7 percent.”); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459
(2004).
2 See John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated
Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 247, 252 (2010) (urging “greater integration of instruction of legal doctrine and rea-
soning, litigation skills, transactional skills, and ADR”). See generally Michael Moffitt,
Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future of ADR in Law Schools (and a
Data-Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 25 (2010)
(reporting various data regarding the status of ADR topics, courses and faculty in the legal
academy).
397
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dispute resolution procedures continues to expand, thus confounding attempted
bright line distinctions between “adjudicative” and “consensual” categories.3
Nonetheless, many judges, lawyers (and law students) do not truly under-
stand the dispute resolution processes that are available and how they should be
used.  In the shadow of the current economic crisis, this lack of knowledge is
likely to have negative consequences, particularly in those areas of practice
such as bankruptcy and foreclosure in which clients, lawyers, regulators, and
courts work under pressure, often with inadequate time and financial resources
to permit careful analysis of procedural options.  Potential negative effects can
include: (1) impairment of a lawyer’s ability to provide her clients with compe-
tent advice regarding the appropriate application of these procedures; (2)
impairment of a lawyer’s ability to suggest new dispute resolution hybrids that
are both creative and implementable; (3) inappropriate use of dispute resolution
procedures, adversely affecting clients, third party beneficiaries/victims, spon-
soring institutions, and the integrity of dispute resolution as a field; (4) inade-
quate regulation, monitoring, and use of dispute resolution procedures; (5) the
temptation of some lawyers, clients, and institutions to make intentionally inap-
propriate and even unethical use of dispute resolution procedures; and (6) new,
and sometimes entirely unnecessary, satellite litigation arising out of the use of
dispute resolution procedures.4  Meanwhile, the current ethics rules for law-
yers, which are based largely on the American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct5 and are supposed to provide some sort of an
ethical and professional brake upon “sharp practices”6 by lawyers,7 are either
so ambiguous or so insufficient in their treatment of “non-adjudicative” dispute
3 See Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can
Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 427, 456-57 (2009) (describing hybrids).
4 See generally James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look
at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006) (describing litigation
arising out of mediation); James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation
Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 395 (2007) (updating previous
research regarding litigation arising out of mediation).
5 The American Bar Association (ABA) maintains several websites regarding state imple-
mentation of ethical rules for lawyers. See, e.g., Charts Comparing Individual Professional
Conduct Model Rules as Adopted or Proposed by States to ABA Model Rules, ABA, http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/pic/rule_charts.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (showing state compar-
isons on a rule-by-rule basis); CPR Policy Implementation Committee, ABA, http://www.aba
net.org/cpr/pic/mrpc.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (state implementation of ethics rules);
Status of State Review of Professional Conduct Rules, ABA, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pic/
ethics_2000_status_chart.pdf (last updated Nov. 3, 2010) (showing states that have adopted
the ABA Model Rules and considered the Ethics 2000 revisions).  My thanks to my col-
league, Laurel Terry, for making me aware of these resources.
6 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (explaining that despite the provision for
discovery in the then-relatively new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring a lawyer to
provide his work product to opposing counsel would inevitably result in “[i]nefficiency,
unfairness and sharp practices . . . in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of
cases for trial”).
7 Of course, the threat of a legal malpractice claim is also supposed to discourage violations
of lawyers’ professional and fiduciary duties.  This Article, however, will deal only with
ethics issues.
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resolution procedures8 that they may invite bad behavior9 by clever clients or
their lawyers.10
Currently, there is limited evidence of these potential negative conse-
quences.  This Article, however, tells two tales—one fictional, the other real—
to illustrate some of the negative effects described supra.  The Article begins
with a hypothetical and considers guidance provided by the relevant provisions
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.11  The Article then turns to In re
American Capital Equipment, Inc.,12 the 2009 case that inspired key elements
of the hypothetical.  Ultimately, this Article will urge that while now is the time
to advocate for the increased use of dispute resolution procedures in bankruptcy
and foreclosure matters, now is also the time to demand more stringent educa-
tion and regulation of lawyers to assist them in making sufficiently knowledge-
able, skillful, and ethical use of “alternative” dispute resolution procedures,
8 In 2002, the Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR drafted a proposed Model Rule
4.5 as an alternative to Model Rule 2.4.  It would have provided for four different types of
process: adjudicative, evaluative, facilitative, and hybrid. See CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM’N
ON ETHICS & STANDARDS IN ADR, MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEU-
TRAL (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULE FOR THE LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL] , avail-
able at http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/0/Resources/ADR%20Tools/Clauses%20&%20Rules/
CPR%20Model%20Rule%20for%20The%20Lawyer%20as%20Third-Party%20Neutral.pdf;
Duane W. Krohnke, ADR Ethics Rules to Be Added to Rules of Professional Conduct,
ALTERNATIVES, June 2000, at 108, 115 (comparing the different potential approaches and
observing that the Model Rule approach offers an “‘exit door’ from the lawyers’ ethical
rules linked to an ‘entrance’ door to an ADR neutral’s ethical rules”).
9 The definition of “bad behavior” is inevitably contested.  Professor Leonard Riskin, for
example, has noted that while mindfulness has the potential to foster ethical behavior, others
have urged that it might make its practitioners “too ethical” for the real world that lawyers
inhabit. See Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and Ethics in Dispute Resolution and Law: Why
Mindfulness Tends to Foster Ethical Behavior, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 493, 502-03 (2009) (cit-
ing Scott Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect
Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83, 96 (2002)).
10 See Symposium, Ethics in the Expanding World of ADR: Considerations, Conundrums,
and Conflicts, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 787 (2008); see, e.g., Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the
Ethics to the Forum: A Proposal for Process-Enabling Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (2005); Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering:
Why Put Old Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 505, 505-08 (2003);
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Lawyer Ethics Must Keep Pace with Practice: Plurality in Lawyering
Roles Demands Diverse and Innovative Ethical Standards, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 420
(2003); Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer
Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving
Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 948-49 (2001); Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Intersec-
tion (Collision) of Ethics, Law, and Dispute Resolution: Clashes, Crashes, No Stops, Yields,
or Rights of Way, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 789, 819 (2008) (“One of the primary purposes of this
symposium was to highlight those arenas where current existing rules and parameters have
little or no relevance.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Maintaining ADR Integrity, ALTERNA-
TIVES, Jan. 2009, at 1, 8 (noting that “there is fear that clever lawyers and manipulative and
profit-hungry (and cost-minimizing) business owners and legal clients have learned to mis-
use some forms of ADR for less-than-honest purposes”).
11 There have been some calls for bankruptcy-specific ethics rules for lawyers. See e.g.,
Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy
Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1998); Nancy B. Rapoport, The Intractable
Problem of Bankruptcy Ethics: Square Peg, Round Hole, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 977, 979
(2002).
12 In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 415 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009).
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especially in the court-connected context.  Further, both the hypothetical and In
re American Capital Equipment, Inc. illustrate law schools’ essential role in
educating students regarding existing dispute resolution procedures and their
application.  Ideally, such education should include opportunities to consult
with real (or, at the very least, simulated) clients regarding procedural issues,
represent clients in such dispute resolution procedures, and experiment with the
development and testing of new and hybrid procedures.  Law schools, mean-
while, are much more likely to incorporate such material into their curricula if
bar exams test for future lawyers’ knowledge and thoughtful application of dis-
pute resolution procedures.  Legal continuing education programs also should
deal with the law and ethics of dispute resolution procedures in more detail to
ensure that practicing lawyers have sufficient knowledge of these matters.
Last, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and states’ ethics rules for law-
yers should be updated to respond to the many ethical ambiguities that cur-
rently haunt non-adjudicative court-connected dispute resolution.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL
The following hypothetical describes an evolving set of facts in a bank-
ruptcy matter.  The hypothetical begins with the foundational facts and the situ-
ation that creates the first of several decision points.  At each decision point, we
seek guidance from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct before moving
on.  The hypothetical is designed to mirror the evolving reality of lawyers’
legal and ethical decision-making and their relationships with clients.13
We represent the rather unimaginatively-named XYZ Company, a pri-
vately held corporation.  XYZ has fallen on hard economic times and has
decided to file for bankruptcy.  Rather than liquidate, however, XYZ will
attempt to stay in business by reorganizing under Chapter 11.  Chapter 11 will
permit our client to continue to control its assets and run its affairs under the
supervision of the Office of the United States Trustee and under the watchful
eyes of creditors and likely other official committees.  Once XYZ develops its
plan of reorganization, its proposed plan will be subject to review by these
parties and the federal bankruptcy court.  Further, the creditors will be able to
vote upon the plan.  The bankruptcy court ultimately will determine whether to
confirm the proposed plan.14
Unfortunately, there are 1,000 pending lawsuits that name XYZ as a
defendant; our client manufactured a product that contained asbestos, and all of
the plaintiffs in these lawsuits allege that their asbestos-related injuries were
due, at least in part, to exposure to XYZ’s product.  XYZ’s insurer, Tightfist,
has not authorized the settlement of a single case, and XYZ has been wrangling
with Tightfist over coverage issues.  Resolution of the pending lawsuits do not
appear to come within the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy court,15 though
13 Like all hypotheticals, however, this one is likely to be an imperfect reflection of that
reality.
14 JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 762 (2d ed. 2007).
15 See Mark L. Desgrosseilliers, Gimme Shelter: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Procedures to Resolve Tort Claims in Bankruptcy, 18 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 19, 21-
23 (2009); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 524(g) (2006); 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B),
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the court might be able to hear and decide all or some of the cases with the
parties’ consent.  The judge, however, has indicated an unwillingness to play
that role.16  The continued existence of the asbestos-related lawsuits has the
potential to hinder our client’s ability to secure funding and solicit potential
buyers, among other things.  XYZ’s CEO has asked for our legal advice on
how to deal with the pending lawsuits.  Not surprisingly, he would like them to
go away.  He also would like the insurer to pay any claims.
A. Understanding Dispute Resolution Options and the Potential
Consequences
We may want to advise XYZ to consider the use of a dispute resolution
procedure to resolve these lawsuits.  Obviously, we will be guided by our cli-
ent’s needs, goals, and legal obligations.  Given the situation, we also may
choose17 or be required to consider, the needs and goals of the plaintiffs in the
(c)(2), (d), (e), 1334(b) (2006); In re Gorilla Companies, 429 B.R. 308, 315 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
2010).  Some commentators and courts prefer to describe statutory limits upon district
courts’ referrals of personal injury and wrongful death claims to bankruptcy courts as merely
“procedural,” rather than “jurisdictional,” limits.  The boundary between these two catego-
ries can be less than distinct and has been the subject of some study.  Nonetheless, because
the question is whether bankruptcy courts possess the constitutional and statutory authority
to adjudicate final and enforceable decisions regarding such claims, I have chosen to use the
language of jurisdiction in this Article. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 17 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4106 (3d ed. 1998) (“The district court may refer bankruptcy
cases to a bankruptcy judge, who is empowered to determine only the so[-]called ‘core pro-
ceedings’ specifically enumerated in the statute.  A bankruptcy court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to liquidate or estimate contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrong-
ful death claims for purposes of distribution.”) (footnotes omitted); Howard M. Wasserman,
The Demise of “Drive-By” Jurisdictional Rulings, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 184, 184-
85 (2011) (“Jurisdiction essentially means ‘legitimate authority.’ Adjudicative jurisdiction
refers to a court’s constitutional and statutory authority (or power) to hear a class of cases
and to consider and resolve the legal and factual issues raised.  Adjudicative-jurisdictional
rules contrast, and often are confused, with two other types of rules: 1) substantive merits
rules that control real-world conduct and function as rules of decision determining the valid-
ity and success of a plaintiff’s claim for relief from a defendant over a particular transaction
or occurrence; and 2) procedural, or ‘claim-processing,’ rules, which determine how a court
processes and adjudicates the claim for relief, and how the parties and the court behave
within the litigation process.”) (footnotes omitted).  The current practice of permitting parties
to consent to bankruptcy courts’ adjudication of such claims is, of course, inconsistent with
the general understanding that parties do not have the power to waive deficiencies of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Wasserman, supra, at 197-98.
16 This is due to the needs of the hypothetical.  In real life, a judge might make this choice
as a result of lack of time, the number of parties involved, etc.
17 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ethical Considerations in Drafting and Enforcing Consumer Arbi-
tration Clauses, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 841, 877 (2008) (urging that “[a]ttorneys representing
companies in drafting or enforcing consumer arbitration clauses should . . . remain commit-
ted to justice and ethical considerations that transcend stark professional conduct rules.  This
means that they should go beyond rote assumptions of arbitration’s benefits to consider the
real risks and impacts of onerous arbitration provisions.  It also means that they should
refuse to draft provisions that, upon reflection, appear likely to conceal companies’ illegal
conduct or squelch consumers’ procedural and substantive rights.”).  The attorneys for XYZ
will need to assist their client in meeting its obligations as a debtor-in-possession under the
Bankruptcy Code.  Thus, these attorneys may have less discretion to accommodate the inter-
ests of those who have not been judged to be creditors. See generally C. R. (“Chip”)
402 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:397
asbestos-related lawsuits as well as XYZ’s other creditors.  But what type(s) of
dispute resolution would be most appropriate?  Would advising XYZ regarding
dispute resolution options be consistent with our ethical obligations as lawyers?
Would we have any concerns about any of the consequences of any of these
dispute resolution procedures for our client?  Would we have any obligation to
disclose these concerns?  Would we need to do any special planning for these
procedures or special preparation of our client?
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, and 2.1 are relevant in
responding to these questions.  Rule 1.1 states: “A lawyer shall provide compe-
tent representation to a client.”18  It further defines “competent representation”
as “requir[ing] the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation rea-
sonably necessary for the representation.”19  Comment 2 is particularly helpful
here:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. . . .  Some important
legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal
drafting, are required in all legal problems.  Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill
that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge.  A lawyer can pro-
vide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study . . . .20
Clearly, we must have sufficient knowledge about the dispute resolution
options available to our client.  The most frequently used “alternative” proce-
dures are negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.  Based on the limited informa-
tion currently available, it seems that any of these could be appropriate here.
Potentially, we also could advise XYZ to use med-arb, which is a hybrid of
mediation and arbitration.  We could even recommend a tiered—or three
step—procedure: offer and exchange as the first step (consisting of a plaintiff’s
submission, a responsive take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer from XYZ, and
plaintiff’s decision whether or not to take the offer), followed by sixty days for
mediation as the second step, if the offer and exchange do not result in settle-
ment, and a third step of binding arbitration in the event that mediation does not
produce a settlement.21  We will need to do more research regarding our client,
its insurance, likelihood of liability, extent of damages, and the impact of our
Chapter 11 posture in order to choose the most appropriate procedure.
Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Debtor Counsel’s Fiduciary Duty: Is There A Duty to Rat
in Chapter 11?, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (2010); C. R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport,
Has the DIP’s Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditors’ Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tion Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47 (1997); Jonathan Lipson, Directors’ Duties to
Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV.
1189 (2003).
18 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
21 See In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc., 134 B.R. 584, 591 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (describing
three-tiered procedure); H. Slayton Dabney, Jr. & Dion W. Hayes, Bankruptcy Lawyers Bet-
ter Tune Up Their ADR Skills: Best Products Is One Case Where Mediation Really Worked,
18 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 16-17 (1999); William J. Woodward, Jr., The Third Way: Media-
tion of Products Claims in the Piper Aircraft Trust, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 468-
69 (2009); Carolyn M. Penna, The Greyhound ADR Program, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1990, at 3
(describing Greyhound bankruptcy and ADR program).
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We also need to be aware that the use of any dispute resolution procedure,
or set of procedures, may predictably involve particular legal problems.  Let’s
begin by returning to the options of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
The fact that these procedures have names suggests that those names mean
something very concrete.  In fact, these procedures can vary dramatically
depending upon the specific procedural elements that the lawyers and clients
select or that the designated dispute resolution neutral imposes.
Negotiation may involve only the lawyers or, consistent with the approach
now used in collaborative and cooperative law,22 could involve the clients in
“four-way meetings.”  Mediation, conversely, involves the addition of a media-
tor to assist with reaching settlement.  The mediator could be a judge, a lawyer,
other professional, or someone who has simply decided to call himself a media-
tor.  The mediator may focus on facilitating the parties’ communications and
decision-making processes, or the mediator may offer his own non-binding
assessment of the claim and propose a settlement range.  The mediator may
even try to help the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ representatives see each other as
fellow human beings, with needs for affiliation, autonomy, and understand-
ing.23  These different approaches to mediation are described in a variety of
ways; “facilitative,”24 “elicitive,”25 “evaluative,”26 “directive,”27 “transforma-
tive,”28 and “understanding-based”29 are just some of the names used to
22 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE
LAW RULES AND UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT 1 (2010), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucla/2010_final.pdf.
23 See Leonard Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in Court-
Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 886-87 (2008) (regarding application of
Fisher and Shapiro categories).
24 See Bernard Mayer, Facilitative Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MOD-
ELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 29 (Jay Folberg et al. eds., 2004) (discussing media-
tion as facilitative process); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24 (1996)
(discussing mediation in facilitative form where mediator clarifies and enhances communica-
tions between parties in order to help them come to decision).
25 See Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New
New Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 23 (2003).
26 See Riskin, supra note 24, at 44-45 (noting that although evaluative approach may make
it easier for parties to reach resolution because evaluative mediator provides recommenda-
tions and assessments, thereby removing some of parties’ decision-making burdens, the
mediator’s evaluations may impede parties’ ability to appreciate their own and each other’s
positions and make the process more antagonistic).
27 See Riskin, supra note 25, at 30 (defining term directive as “almost any conduct by
[which] the mediator directs the mediation process, or the participants, toward a particular
procedure or perspective or outcome”).
28 See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE
TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 46, 217-18 (rev. ed. 2005) (describing the trans-
formative theory as based on the notion that people perceive conflict as an interactional crisis
and the role of a transformative-oriented mediator as assisting parties in overcoming their
crisis by allowing parties to define the mediation process and encouraging fully-informed
voluntary resolution, rather than forcing settlement); Robert A. Baruch Bush & Sally
Ganong Pope, Changing the Quality of Conflict Interaction: The Principles and Practice of
Transformative Mediation, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 67, 77  (2002) (“In the transformative
mediation process, parties can recapture their sense of competence and connection, reverse
the negative conflict cycle, re-establish a constructive (or at least neutral) interaction and
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describe different models.  Some mediators specialize in one approach while
others use a mix of approaches and techniques.
Arbitration, meanwhile, also comes in many variations.  It may result in a
binding award, or it may be non-binding.  The process can involve one arbitra-
tor or a three-member panel.  The arbitrator(s) may exercise complete discre-
tion in determining an award or be limited by a provision for “high-low” or
“final offer”30 (also called “baseball”) arbitration.  The parties may choose to
be bound by pre-existing rules of evidence—or not.  Med-arb (mediation fol-
lowed by arbitration) and the tiered provisions described supra31 could involve
a single neutral serving first as the mediator and then becoming the arbitrator,
or we might select a different neutral for each phase.
Each named procedure, meanwhile, could invoke different legal obliga-
tions and limits.  This is relatively obvious for arbitration, in light of the deci-
sions that must be made regarding the binding nature of the arbitrator’s award,
the scope of the arbitrator’s authority, the relevance of federal or state rules of
evidence, etc.  Many mediation advocates (and opponents), however, still view
the mediation process as primarily “non-legal.”32  In actuality, the process can
be laden with legal issues.  Most mediators, for example, will promise to keep
“confidential” any communication that occurs in mediation, even if the com-
munication constitutes an admission of liability or could lead to evidence
undermining a claim.  This all seems quite self-evident until problems arise.
Will the communications between the mediator and one or more of the lawyers
move forward on a positive footing, with the mediator’s help.”); Joseph Folger, Harmony
and Transformative Mediation Practice: Sustaining Ideological Differences in Purpose and
Practice, 84 N.D. L. REV. 823, 844-48 (2008) (articulating four types of transformative
mediation techniques that “characterize the essential elements of transformative interven-
tions”: allowing parties to control the process, mediator’s maintenance of the non-directive
role, encouraging parties’ expression and examination of differences, and supporting parties’
transformations toward enlightenment and self-empowerment); Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B.
Bingham, Transformative Mediation in the USPS Redress Program: Observations of ADR
Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 399, 401-02 (2001) (examining transformative
mediation in the employment setting as a viable alternative to the traditional adversarial-
based process and as a vehicle for parties to seize greater control over their own conflicts and
learn how to effectively manage future conflicts).
29 See generally GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING CONFLICT: MEDIA-
TION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008).
30 See Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic
and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 384 (1999); see also Jason B.
Shorter, Final-Offer Arbitration for Health Care Billing Disputes: Analyzing One State’s
Proposed Dispute Resolution Process, 9 APPALACHIAN J.L. 191, 199-201 (2010).
31 See supra text accompanying note 21.
32 See Brian Jarrett, The Future of Mediation: A Sociological Perspective, 2009 J. DISP.
RESOL. 49, 74 (anticipating a growing divide between “legal and non-legal” parts of the
mediation field); Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a Chi-
nese Lower Court, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 75, 95 (2006) (observing that “skills required in
mediation are no longer legal knowledge, but mostly interpersonal skills and familiarity with
the customs of the local community” or “nonlegal skills”); see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-
Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe
Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 64 n.60 (2004) (noting that “the practice of
mediation has evolved to accommodate a diverse range of mediator and party expectations,
which are highly dependent on context” and that key contextual elements are whether dis-
putes are legal or non-legal and whether mediation is conducted within or outside the court).
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occurring prior to the date set for the mediation session, or after it, be consid-
ered “mediation communications?”  Will the parties’ actions during mediation
be considered “mediation communications?”  If the definition of “mediation
communications” that is contained in the agreement to mediate varies from the
definition contained in the relevant court’s local rule, which controls?  Many
states’ legislatures and courts have adopted mediation privilege statutes.33
Under what circumstances will parties be deemed to have waived the privilege?
What findings must a court make in order to permit testimony by the mediator
or entry of a document into evidence, regardless of the claimed privilege?  If
the “mediator” is an employee of the one of the parties, will this “mediation”
come within the privilege statute?  The answers to these questions can vary
dramatically from state to state, though several states now pattern their media-
tion privilege after the provisions of the Uniform Mediation Act.34  The federal
courts have also developed their own evidentiary privilege for mediation.35
Which definition of the privilege will prevail in the event that a state’s eviden-
tiary rules differ from federal common law?36
We had also considered recommending med-arb or a tiered process that
might result in the same neutral serving as mediator and then arbitrator.  If the
neutral conducts part of the mediation phase in caucus—thus engaging in ex
parte communications with each party—and the case fails to settle and then
proceeds to the binding arbitration phase, may the neutral—now the arbitra-
tor—consider what she learned in caucus?  Because neither party would be
aware of what was said in caucus by the other party, it would seem that the due
process right to confront adverse witnesses would be violated.37  Generally,
such a Constitutional right would not apply to private arbitration,38 but if the
33 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 44.401-.406 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000).
34 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
(2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.pdf;
see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2710.01-.10 (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 7.07.010-.904 (West 2005).
35 See Lisa A. Lomax, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: Rule 9019 and Bank-
ruptcy Mediation Programs, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 76 (1994).
36 See FED. R. EVID. 501.  In cases involving both federal and state claims, this has the
potential to raise interesting Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins issues, but I will save that dis-
cussion and analysis for another day.
37 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 721-22 (2006) (recognizing Hamdan’s right to
confront witnesses against him); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (finding that
the military commission violated due process, due to detainee’s lack of knowledge of evi-
dence against him and subsequent inability to question such evidence); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (identifying the opportunity to question adverse witnesses as
one of the elements of due process); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 784
(2008).
38 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 47-48; Sarah
Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities Arbitration: A Constitutional Mandate?, 26 PACE L.
REV. 73, 76 (2005); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 994-1009 (2000);
Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Pro-
cess Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 40-47 (1997); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial
Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 431 (2010) (citing
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Federal Arbitration Act applied, perhaps the due process jurisprudence could be
imported into one of the provisions for vacatur.39
The resolution of these legal issues involving mediation could lead to very
different consequences for lawyers, clients, third party beneficiaries/victims,
and mediators.  In fact, satellite litigation has already arisen, most often when
one of the parties seeks to set aside or enforce a mediated settlement agreement
or discover information revealed in mediation in order to pursue related
claims.40  Fortunately, the incidence of such litigation is not high, but it is
increasing.41  Meanwhile, there are significant numbers of lawsuits filed to
vacate arbitral awards or set aside or enforce negotiated agreements or pre-
Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward A State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 85 CAL. L.  REV. 577, 615-19 (1997)) (summarizing arguments made regarding
the potential for private arbitration to represent state action).
39 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2006) (providing for vacatur “where the arbitrators were guilty
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”).
40 See, e.g., Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1097 (Cal. 2011) (communications
between lawyer and client while in caucus found to be confidential under California statutes
and thus excluded from evidence in subsequent legal malpractice action); Rojas v. Superior
Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270 (Cal. 2004) (plaintiff-tenant was not permitted access to photo-
graphs taken by building owner for use in her own mediation with contractor); Foxgate
Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001) (court had no
inherent power to fashion exception to California’s rigorous mediation confidentiality statute
that would permit mediator to disclose sanctionable conduct); Porter v. Wyner, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 653, 660-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (involving the admissibility of communications
between attorney and client while in caucus during mediation); In re Waller, 573 A.2d 780,
785 n.5 (D.C. 1990) (lawyer-mediator in court-ordered mediation acted properly in reporting
counsel’s misconduct to judge, who then reported it to bar counsel; mediation confidentiality
order not applicable); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
supra note 34, at 30 (“Mediators . . . are not precluded by the Act from reporting misconduct
to an agency or tribunal other than one that might make a ruling on the dispute being medi-
ated.”); In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, Inc., 424 B.R. 76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (sanctioning
counsel for failure to engage in sufficient discussion and risk analysis while in court-ordered
mediation). See generally Ellen Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidenti-
ality: Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79 (2001); Rebecca
H. Hiers, Navigating Mediation’s Uncharted Waters, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 531, 576-78
(2005); Mori Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Obligation Under the Rules of Professional
Conduct to Report Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 155
(1994); Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Con-
flict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the
Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 733-34.
41 See Coben & Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, supra note 4, at 395
(reporting 95 percent increase in litigation involving mediation issues between 1999 and
2003; also reporting a steady increase in federal opinions); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning
Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institu-
tionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 87 (2001) (proposing use of a three-day cooling
off period for mediated agreements in order to reduce likelihood of legal enforcement battles
and increase likelihood of good mediation practice).  There is also potential for mediator
liability claims. See Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81, 87-88 (2003); Michael L. Moffitt, The Four Ways to Assure
Mediator Quality (and Why None of Them Work), 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 191, 222-
23 (2009) (noting that cases finding a mediator liable are unlikely to occur, but could none-
theless have strong deterrent effects).
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dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.  Rule 1.1, along with Comment 2, make
clear that if we choose to advise XYZ regarding the selection, contractual crea-
tion, and implementation of any dispute resolution procedures, we are likely to
violate our obligation to provide competent representation if we do not under-
stand the differences among the primary dispute resolution procedures writ
large as well as the differences among each procedure’s variations arising out
of its different component parts and placement within different substantive and
jurisdictional contexts.
Do we need to advise XYZ regarding these procedures and the differences
among them?  According to Rule 1.2, we must abide by XYZ’s decisions
regarding the objectives of our representation, but are required only to “con-
sult” with our client regarding the means by which we will try to achieve these
objectives.42  Rule 1.4(a)(2) elaborates that “[a] lawyer shall. . . reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to
be accomplished,”43 while Rule 2.1 provides that “a lawyer shall exercise inde-
pendent professional judgment and render candid advice.”44  Comment 5 to
Rule 2.1 specifically references the counseling of clients regarding the potential
use of dispute resolution:
In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client.  How-
ever, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to
result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer’s duty to the
client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client’s course of
action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve
litigation, it may be necessary under Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute
resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation.  A lawyer ordi-
narily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client’s affairs or to give advice that
the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when
doing so appears to be in the client’s interest.45
These rules suggest that we certainly will not violate our ethical obligations if
we choose to advise XYZ about the potential use of dispute resolution proce-
dures that might assist with its planned reorganization.46  At the same time, the
conditional language of Comment 5 makes it less than clear that we have an
affirmative obligation to provide this advice.  Some states, on the other hand,
have found such an obligation.47
If we decide to provide this advice to XYZ, how much does the CEO need
to know?  The significant differences among dispute resolution procedures,
described supra, suggest the importance of ensuring that clients are sufficiently
42 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007).
43 Id. R. 1.4(a)(2) (emphasis added).
44 Id. R. 2.1.
45 Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
46 Comment 5 may even suggest that we missed an important opportunity to advise our
client about alternatives to litigation when plaintiffs first began filing their asbestos-related
claims.
47 See Kristin L. Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional
Paradigm and a Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 626, n.268 (2009) (listing Virginia, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Oregon, Massachusetts, and Missouri as states that have statutes or ethics
opinions requiring lawyers to advise clients about ADR).
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informed about the procedures and their potential consequences.  Rule 1.4(b)
provides that “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion.”48  Comment 5 to Rule 1.4 expands upon this requirement and muddies
the waters:
The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be
pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so.  Adequacy of communi-
cation depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For exam-
ple, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer
should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agree-
ment.  In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of
success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in
significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordina-
rily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail.  The guid-
ing principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for
information consistent with the duty to act in the client’s best interests, and the cli-
ent’s overall requirements as to the character of representation.49
In deferring to “reasonable client expectations”50 and “the client’s overall
requirements as to the character of representation,”51 Comment 5 unfortunately
seems to substitute the ethics of the marketplace for a general professional ethic
that is consistently applicable.  Sophisticated clients with substantial experience
with dispute resolution options are likely to know enough to demand advice
regarding the potential legal consequences of using a particular procedure
within a particular context, regardless of the cost or time restrictions.  Unso-
phisticated clients—or clients swept up in financial turmoil—are much less
likely to make this demand or even know they could make it.52  And then, of
course, a lawyer who would prefer to operate autonomously may question
whether such client expectations are objectively “reasonable,” especially if time
is short and the client has no resources to fund the research that will be
required.
This Article only raises these issues in order to suggest the importance of
lawyers’ and clients’ understanding of the dispute resolution processes they
propose to use and the likelihood that the time-and-resource-limited bankruptcy
and foreclosure contexts will make such understanding both more important
and less likely.  This Article will now return to the hypothetical.
B. Developing Creative Dispute Resolution Options That Respond to Client
Needs
XYZ’s CEO reminds us that the company’s insurer, Tightfist, has affirma-
tively refused to settle any of the pending lawsuits.  XYZ still wants to settle
48 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b).
49 Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in
Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES, at 68, 84-86 (1998) (contrast-
ing the needs of corporate clients with the needs of individual clients and comparing law-
yers’ treatment of these two types of clients).
Spring 2011] INTEGRATING ADR INTO BANKRUPTCY 409
these plaintiffs’ claims—for both financial and reputational reasons—and the
CEO asks for our advice on how to achieve this.  He adds, though, that we
cannot spend any of XYZ’s limited money on settlement.  This presents quite a
challenge.
A law student intern who sat in on the meeting with XYZ’s CEO asks to
speak with us after the meeting.  She suggests that XYZ could offer mediation
to the plaintiffs, and any plaintiff using the process could be required to give
XYZ 20 percent of any amount received in settlement.  By using the process, a
plaintiff would automatically consent to the 20 percent payment.  This idea is
brilliantly creative53 and responds directly to the CEO’s request.  The plan
would settle the lawsuits, fund XYZ’s administration of its mediation program,
get some money to injured plaintiffs, pay the mediators and lawyers, and possi-
bly even expand the estate to permit distribution of additional funds to some of
XYZ’s other creditors.  Would proposing this means of funding a dispute reso-
lution procedure be consistent with our ethical obligations?  Are there any
potential disadvantages to our client or third parties that we would need to
discuss?
At the risk of stating the obvious, this proposal transforms XYZ and the
asbestos plaintiffs from adversaries into uneasy allies, in league against
Tightfist.  XYZ, which wants to settle these lawsuits and now stands to gain
financially from each settlement, will have every incentive to assist the plain-
tiffs in winning as much compensation as possible for their injuries.  XYZ may
even perceive a form of rough justice in this proposal if it has regularly paid
insurance premiums to its insurers in order to gain protection from the potential
liability currently posed by plaintiffs’ lawsuits.  After all, it is Tightfist’s refusal
to settle these cases that is arguably the cause of the additional and unnecessary
financial difficulties currently faced by XYZ as it scrambles to find new financ-
ing to support its reorganization.  While Tightfist is likely to charge XYZ and
us with “sharp practices” if we successfully persuade XYZ to pursue this idea,
XYZ could argue that it was Tightfist’s refusal to settle that represented the
first aggressive, inappropriate move.  Indeed, we may have good reason to sus-
pect that Tightfist’s refusal to settle is motivated by its own interest in conserv-
ing money; if XYZ is liquidated rather than reorganized, the plaintiffs will be
unlikely to pursue their claims against XYZ, especially if the plaintiffs’ lawyers
also learn about Tightfist’s reservations regarding the scope of XYZ’s insur-
ance coverage.  Tightfist may not have to make any payments at all.
What a mess.  Of course, this dispute is all about money and who should
get it or keep it.  It is also about how the involvement of insurers regularly
violates key assumptions underlying the adversarial system.  Further, it is about
the use of settlement with some to encourage payment by others.54  And last, it
53 See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem-Solving, 87 MARQ. L.
REV. 697 (2004) (providing several tools to encourage creative thinking); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal
Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97 (2001).
54
“Mary Carter” agreements represent an example of plaintiffs and settling defendants
entering into agreements that lead to shared interest in the success of plaintiffs’ suit against
the non-settling defendants. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Cont’l Imports, Inc., 610 A.2d 446, 448
(Pa. 1992) (describing “Mary Carter” agreements in the course of determining the admissi-
410 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:397
is about the challenge of making difficult moral choices in a world where other
people often are the only means55 available to allow us to achieve our own
ends.
The Model Rules at this point are not very helpful.  Regarding our own
obligations as advocates, Rule 3.1 provides that we “shall not . . . assert or
controvert an issue [in a proceeding], unless there is a basis in law and fact for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law,”56 while Rule 4.4 directs
that we “shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”57  Though the law student’s
financing idea has some uncomfortable consequences, it is not frivolous and
has substantial purposes other than the imposition of a burden upon Tightfist or
the plaintiffs.  And as Comment 1 to Rule 3.1 observes, “[T]he law is not
always clear and never is static.”58
Meanwhile, we recall that Rule 1.4 provides that we “shall . . . reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to
be accomplished” and “shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably neces-
sary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion.”59  But what exactly shall we say about the creative financing
incorporated into the law student’s proposal?  Comment 5 deserves a second
look on this point, particularly its instruction that in litigation, we “ordinarily
should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant
expense or to injure or coerce others.”60  While our proposal will help any
injured plaintiffs, it also could significantly reduce the amount they will receive
from any settlements.  Tightfist received premiums from our client, but our
proposal may cause the insurer to suffer an otherwise-unlikely and significant
expense.  Still, Comment 5 describes what we “should” do; it does not use the
word “shall.”  That is obviously significant.  Perhaps we do not need to talk
with XYZ about the potential negative impacts upon the plaintiffs or insurer
after all.
Rule 2.1, meanwhile, provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice”61
and “[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors that may
be relevant to the client’s situation.”62  XYZ’s CEO is likely to welcome a
proposal that helps his beleaguered company to meet its needs.  He may be less
bility of evidence regarding settling defendants’ financial interest in plaintiffs’ success at
trial).  The next step, of course, has been the rise of third parties who view litigation as just
another investment vehicle. See generally Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?
Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
55 See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means: Negotiating with
Respect, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (2001).
56 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
57 Id. R. 4.4.
58 Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 1.
59 Id. R. 1.4.
60 Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 5.
61 Id. R. 2.1.
62 Id.
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likely to welcome any cautionary words regarding the potential negative effects
of implementing the proposal.  Again, the operative verb in the rule is “may”
rather than “shall.”  Comments 1 and 2 to Rule 2.1 also appear relevant and
provide:
A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer’s honest assess-
ment.  Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may
be disinclined to confront.  In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the
client’s morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits.  How-
ever, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that
the advice will be unpalatable to the client.63
Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predomi-
nant.  Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate.  It is
proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving
advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical consid-
erations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law
will be applied.64
The last sentence in Comment 2 may be especially helpful to us here.  Though
the law student’s proposal is clearly responsive and may not present any obvi-
ous illegalities, it is very possible that its consequences and moral ambiguities
could give rise to serious legal problems if XYZ remains a going concern.65
Still, the language is “may”—and XYZ is fighting for its survival.
C. The Candor of Communications in Mediation
Our meeting with XYZ’s CEO to discuss the potential use of dispute reso-
lution has not yet occurred.  The law student provides us with a memorandum
describing mediation in more detail.  We find ourselves particularly interested
in her description of the advantages of the communication that can occur in this
process.
The law student’s memorandum notes that mediation is a “facilitated
negotiation” and a “non-adjudicative process” that allows more flexibility for
the parties, both in terms of its outcomes and its procedures.  Though the medi-
ator may offer his or her assessment of a case’s strengths and weaknesses and
may even suggest solutions, a mediator is “not authorized to make a decision
that is binding upon the parties.”  The memorandum also points out that media-
tion communications are supposed to be confidential66 and often are protected
from admission at trial in order to encourage “frank conversation that may have
the potential to result in creative, customized solutions.”  Given this student’s
63 Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
64 Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
65 See, for example, the mandatory arbitration clauses in boilerplate contracts that provided
for payment of all fees by employees or customers or location of the arbitral forum in a
location thousands of miles away, etc.  To the extent that lawyers were involved in the
drafting of these clauses, it seems that Comment 2 might have served as a useful touchstone
for appropriate advising of clients regarding potential lawsuits and their costs and merits.
See Schmitz, supra note 17, at 872 (considering the ethical obligations of lawyers advising
clients regarding consumer arbitration clauses in boilerplate contracts).
66 See cases cited supra note 40.
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gift for creative problem solving, we are not surprised that her memorandum
extols the value of the creativity offered by the mediation process.
Some of the language used by the law student to describe the frank con-
versation that can occur in mediation, however, sounds strangely familiar.  We
return to the Model Rules for guidance regarding lawyers’ ethical obligations in
the process, especially regarding candor.  We discover several relevant rules
and comments.  Though the focus of Rule 2.4 is on lawyers serving as neutrals,
Comment 5 addresses lawyers representing clients in various dispute resolution
processes.  It provides:
Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are gov-
erned by the Rules of Professional Conduct.  When the dispute-resolution process
takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(m)), the lawyer’s
duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3.  Otherwise, the lawyer’s duty of candor
toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1.67
Essentially, this Comment provides us with a road map to navigate through the
other relevant rules.  Rule 3.3(a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly
. . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the law-
yer.”68  Comment 1 informs us that Rule 3.3 “governs the conduct of a lawyer
who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. . . . It also applies
when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted
pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition.”69
Comment 2, meanwhile, explains the rationale for this rule:
This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.  A lawyer acting as
an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s
case with persuasive force.  Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences
of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal
. . . .
70
Obviously, the definition of a “tribunal” is important here.  We need to know
whether representations to a mediator must meet these requirements.  Rule
1.0(m) provides that a tribunal is:
a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, admin-
istrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity.  A legislative body,
administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral
official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will
render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular
matter.71
Meanwhile, Rule 3.9 applies selected portions of Rule 3.3 to some non-adjudi-
cative proceedings:
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative body or administrative agency in a
nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
68 Id. R. 3.3 (emphasis added).
69 Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
70 Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
71 Id. R. 1.0(m) (emphasis added).
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capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a)
through (c), and 3.5.72
Somewhat unbelievably, these rules suggest that unless mediation is considered
“an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the . . . adjudicative author-
ity”73 of the federal bankruptcy court or the trial courts involved in the disposi-
tion of XYZ’s bankruptcy and plaintiffs’ asbestos claims, neither we nor
opposing counsel will be required to correct or avoid making knowingly false
statements of fact or law to the mediator.  In contrast, we would have those
obligations in a private arbitration.74  If the bankruptcy judge has to approve
72 Id. R. 3.9 (emphasis added); see ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 93-375 (1993) (lawyer representing bank in routine examination by banking
agency not subject to duty of candor required by Rule 3.3 by virtue of Rule 3.9, but “lawyer
may not under any circumstances lie to or mislead agency officials” and “may not be a party
to fraud on the part of the client, and must take all steps necessary to avoid assisting the
client in a course of action she reasonably believes to be fraudulent”); cf. Phila. Bar Ass’n.
Prof’l Guidance Comm., Ethics Op. 2002-3 (2002) (lawyer who learns client misstated mate-
rial fact to Immigration and Naturalization Service required to reveal misstatement; Rules
3.3 and 3.9 require disclosure if INS is deemed a tribunal, but, even if it is not a tribunal,
Pennsylvania Rules 1.6, 3.9, and 4.1 require disclosure). See generally Lawrence G. Baxter,
Reforming Legal Ethics in a Regulated Environment: An Introductory Overview, 8 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 181 (1995) (urging that Rule 3.9 does not adequately require disclosure of
fraud).
73 See, e.g., In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396, 404 (D.C. 2006) (lawyer who submit-
ted fraudulent Criminal Justice Act voucher to court for payment violated Rule 3.3(a)(1); the
committee erred in holding that neither the accounting branch of the superior court nor the
judge functioned as “tribunal” when processing the voucher); In re Diggs, 544 S.E.2d 628,
629 (S.C. 2001) (lawyer violated Rule by knowingly submitting false information on CLE
compliance report filed with commission on continuing legal education). But see Fla. Bar v.
Rotstein, 835 So. 2d 241, 248 (Fla. 2002) (lawyer who lies to bar grievance committee not
guilty of making false statement to “tribunal” for Rule 3.3 purposes); In re Brigandi, 843 So.
2d 1083, 1088 n.4 (La. 2003) (declining to find Rule 3.3 violation for failure to make full
disclosure to Office of Disciplinary Counsel when giving sworn statement; “while the ODC
acts under the auspices of this court, it is not the type of ‘tribunal’ contemplated by the
professional rules”).
74 In 2002, the Commission on Ethics and Standards in ADR drafted a proposed Model
Rule 4.5 as an alternative to Model Rule 2.4.  It would have provided for four different types
of process: adjudicative, evaluative, facilitative, and hybrid. See MODEL RULE FOR THE
LAWYER AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL, supra note 8, at 2-3; Duane W. Krohnke, supra note 8,
at 108; Margaret L. Shaw & Elizabeth Plapinger, Ethical Guidelines: ADR Provider Organi-
zations Should Increase Transparency, Disclosure, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 14,
14; see also Richard M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting Conciliation Back into the
Process: The Peacemaking Approach to Resolution, Peace, and Healing, 54 DRAKE L. REV.
259, 268-71 (2006); Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the
Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 479, 483-91 (2000); Matt Wise, Separation Between the Cross-Practice of Law and
Mediation: Emergence of Proposed Model Rule 2.4, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 383,
398-411 (2001). See generally Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected General
Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution, and the Experi-
ence of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 1, 37-38 (Donna Stienstra & Susan Yates
eds., 2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many “Cs” of Professional
Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2001); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV.
63, 74 (2002) (questioning what duty of candor applies when Rule 3.3 does not apply);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers:
Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 639-40 (1997) (not-
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the plan to use mediation as a component part of the reorganization plan,75 this
may mean that the process could be considered “an ancillary proceeding”
occurring pursuant to the court’s “adjudicative authority.”76  Then we would
need to meet the requirements of candor that apply to our communications with
tribunals.
If neither the bankruptcy judge nor the trial judge is involved with the
mediation, however, it appears that only the lesser obligations of Rule 4.1 will
apply.  We are not permitted to “knowingly . . . make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person; or . . . fail to disclose a material fact to a
third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraud-
ulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”77  Comment
2 to Rule 4.1 will be important to consider as we try to distinguish between
“puffery” and statements “of material fact.”78  Indeed, we should probably do
some research to be sure we are clear regarding what constitute material facts
ing a similar ambiguity in the Restatement regarding whether an early neutral evaluation or
mediation session would be considered a tribunal); Douglas H. Yarn, Lawyer Ethics in ADR
and the Recommendations of Ethics 2000 to Revise the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct: Considerations for Adoption and State Application, 54 ARK. L. REV. 207 (2001).
75 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006) (regarding the allowance of claims in bankruptcy).  My
thanks to Marie Reilly for raising this potential application within the bankruptcy context.
76 The argument that mediation represents an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to
the court’s adjudicative authority may be stronger in bankruptcy than in the usual civil litiga-
tion context because the reorganization plan will be enforceable—or “binding,” to use one of
the key terms contained in Rule 1.0(m)—only with the bankruptcy court’s approval.  In
contrast, most settlements emerging from court-ordered mediation sessions do not require
court approval to be enforceable.  There are exceptions, of course—e.g., settlements of class
actions and shareholder derivative suites, as well as divorce and child custody agreements.
See Russell Korobkin et al., The Law of Bargaining, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 183,
187 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006).
77 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2007) (emphasis added); see ABA Standing
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-439 (2006) (obligation of truthful-
ness is the same whether or not mediation is “caucused”); see also Don Peters, When Law-
yers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J.
DISP. RESOL. 119, 121 (“Communications regarding material facts constitute the category of
information most directly regulated by existing ethical rules and substantive doctrines.
Nothing in the [ABA’s] Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), as enacted by
the forty-four states which pattern their ethical governance substantially on these guidelines,
directly addresses lawyers’ obligations to be truthful when negotiating during mediations.
Despite arguments to do so, the Ethics 2000 Commission charged with making necessary
amendments to the Model Rules, chose not to recommend for mediation the more stringent
standard of honesty that applies to trials and forbids false statements regarding all facts
regardless of materiality.  This makes it safe to assume that the regulations regarding truth-
fulness in negotiation apply to mediations.”).
78 Comment 2 provides:
This Rule refers to statements of fact.  Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one
of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation,
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.  Estimates of
price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an undisclosed
principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.  Lawyers should
be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious
misrepresentation.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
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and law in the context of bankruptcy and asbestos claims,79 as well as consider-
ing the likelihood of fraud and criminal activity in these contexts.  We will
need to do this research in order to ensure our own ethical conduct—and to be
aware of how far opposing counsel might go.  Comment 1, meanwhile, sug-
gests that we also will need to be certain we can determine the statements—or
failures to speak—that could count as misrepresentations.80
Rule 8.4, which is referenced in Comment 1 to Rule 3.3, provides that “[i]t
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]”81  Comment 2 to Rule 8.4
offers the following: “Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire
criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses
that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses
involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the
administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses,
79 See Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attor-
ney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); see also Robert P.
Burns, Some Ethical Issues Surrounding Mediation, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 696 (2001)
(the minimalist approach of Rule 4.1 in imposing the obligation of truthfulness is due to
“moral ambiguity of truthfulness as an ideal in the context of share bargaining” and difficul-
ties of enforcing truth-telling rule in “community of two”); Charles B. Carver, Negotiation
Ethics: How to Be Deceptive Without Being Dishonest/How to Be Assertive Without Being
Offensive, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 713, 715 (1997) (“[T]he fundamental question is not whether
legal negotiators may use misrepresentations to further client interests, but when and about
what they may permissibly dissemble.”); Nathan M. Crystal, The Lawyer’s Duty to Disclose
Material Facts in Contract or Settlement Negotiations, 87 KY. L.J. 1055, 1083 (1999);
Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving
Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 778 (2006); E. Cliff
Martin & T. Karena Dees, The Truth About Truthfulness: The Proposed Commentary to Rule
4.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 777, 778-79
(2002); Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A Brief Introduction to the Problems of
Perfect Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83, 94 (2002) (taking issue with
implication in Rule 4.1 and Comment that “barring all types of misrepresentation would
demand too much”); Barry R. Temkin, Misrepresentation by Omission in Settlement Negoti-
ations: Should There Be a Silent Safe Harbor?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 179, 186-87
(2004); Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin
Frankel’s Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613
(2005) (analyzing the impact of the 1975 argument that ethics rules should forbid material
omissions and should affirmatively compel certain disclosures); Gerald Wetlaufer, The Eth-
ics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1220-23 (1990); Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 51 & n.287,
52 (2005).
80 Comment 1 provides:
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf, but generally
has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts.  A misrepresentation can
occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is
false.  Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions
that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.  For dishonest conduct that does not
amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of
representing a client, see Rule 8.4.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
81 Id. R. 8.4.
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even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indif-
ference to legal obligation.”82
Rule 8.4 does not seem entirely consistent with Rule 4.1.  Perhaps the
Preamble to the Model Rules would help us in determining how we and oppos-
ing counsel should behave in mediation.  It provides that in addition to being a
representative of clients, a lawyer is “an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”83  The Preamble
even references lawyers’ role in negotiation: “As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a
result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest
dealings with others.”84  The lofty aspiration of engaging in “honest dealings
with others” also does not sound consistent with the language of Rule 4.1 and
the way in which it permits the duty of candor in negotiation and other consen-
sual procedures to vary from the requirements of Rules 3.3 and 3.9—even in
court-connected and agency-connected mediation.  The Preamble is merely
aspirational, however, while Rule 4.1 is enforceable.85
D. Bringing the Power of Judicial Enforcement into Mediation
Our follow-up meeting with XYZ’s CEO still has not taken place.  We
have discussed the law student’s idea and memorandum internally, and there
are concerns that some of the plaintiffs will refuse to give 20 percent of their
mediated settlements to XYZ.  If the plaintiffs refuse, the plan will then fail to
achieve one of XYZ’s key goals.  Our relentlessly creative law student sends an
e-mail with the responsive proposal that any such enforcement issues could be
taken to the bankruptcy judge.  The bankruptcy judge, however, has already
indicated an unwillingness to make final determinations in the asbestos-related
lawsuits.  Even if the judge were willing, we strongly suspect that Tightfist
would object that the judge was exceeding his jurisdictional limits.86  But the
law student says that if our “ADR Plan” specifies that the bankruptcy judge is
being asked to serve as an “appellate mediator” (which, admittedly, has no
recognizable meaning in and of itself) and not as a “judge,” the jurisdictional
limitations would not seem to apply.
This is another creative and responsive idea.  It is consistent with the idea
that litigants should be able to customize what they will receive from the
courts,87 though the courts have not always agreed to go along.88  Would pro-
82 Id. R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).
83 Id. pmbl.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
85 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 166 (1999) (referencing the classic dilemma of whether legal
ethics should focus upon the expression of aspirations or the regulation of bad behavior).
86 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  Tightfist’s standing in this case, particularly
its standing to deny consent in this context, is somewhat unclear and well beyond the scope
of this Article.
87 See Symposium, Competing and Complementary Rule Systems: Civil Procedure and
ADR, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481 (2005); see also Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litiga-
tion: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462
(2007) (arguing “that the current set of procedural rules should be treated as default rules,
rather than as nonnegotiable parameters); Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers’ Bargaining Ethics, Con-
tract, and Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of Professional
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posing this re-designation of the bankruptcy judge present any ethical issues for
us?
The Model Rules are not very helpful on this question either.  This most
recent idea might represent “knowingly assist[ing] a judge or judicial officer in
conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other
law”89 which is prohibited by Rule 8.4, if this arrangement is inconsistent with
the jurisdictional limits that federal law places upon bankruptcy judges.90  Lan-
guage in the Preamble also appears relevant even though it has no practical
binding effect: “A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and
for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials.”91
Asking a bankruptcy judge to call himself an “appellate mediator” and poten-
tially overstep his jurisdictional bounds may, indeed, demonstrate a lack of
respect for the position of judge and the judicial system.  Tellingly, some have
recently argued that we can best demonstrate our respect for the judicial system
by respecting the limits of its capacities and power.92  As Justice Scalia
recently noted, the nation’s courts are not a Mr. (or Ms.) Fix-It93 available to
clean up every mess made by every executive officer, legislator, private
party—or lawyer.94
E. A Pause for Reflection
There is so much that is unclear, and there are so many issues raised by
this hypothetical.  What is clear is that we should not advise our client regard-
ing this ADR plan for mediation, or recommend its use, until we have thor-
Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 519-20 (2005) (discussing the stringency of immutable
rules and the potential bargaining and flexibility involved with default rules); Riskin &
Welsh, supra note 23, at 919-21 (discussing how courts should offer to “customize”
mediation).
88 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (agreeing with
Ninth Circuit’s holding that “terms of the arbitration agreement controlling the mode of
judicial review are unenforceable and severable”); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund Ltd.,
547 F.3d 109, 113-15 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding that court was not obligated, absent excep-
tional circumstances, to grant parties’ joint motion to vacate a district court’s judgment
granting sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel, even though the parties had made their settle-
ment contingent upon the granting of the motion).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
90 See supra note 15 (identifying the current lack of clarity regarding categorization of these
limits as “jurisdictional” or merely “procedural,” with a consequent lack of clarity regarding
parties’ power to consent to judges’ assumption of roles and behaviors not specifically iden-
tified as permissible by statute or rule).
91 Id. pmbl.
92 See, e.g., IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 66 (2003).
93 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576-77 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is a
certain harmony of approach in the plurality’s making up for Congress’s failure to invoke the
Suspension Clause and its making up for the Executive’s failure to apply what it says are
needed procedures—an approach that reflects what might be called a Mr. Fix-it Mentality.
The plurality seems to view it as its mission to Make Everything Come Out Right, rather
than merely to decree the consequences, as far as individual rights are concerned, of the
other two branches’ actions and omissions.”).
94 Despite these concerns, it is important to note that bankruptcy judges are permitted to
step beyond their jurisdictional limits with the parties’ consent. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
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oughly researched the relevant law and ethics.  What is also clear is that our
client, XYZ, does not have the resources to fund such research.  And therefore,
if we (or plaintiffs’ counsel) nonetheless propose this idea, we (and our client,
plaintiffs, opposing counsel, the insurer and its counsel, the mediator and the
court) will be flying blind—an obviously risky venture.
This hypothetical also makes clear that advocates for the institutionaliza-
tion of mediation and other dispute resolution procedures in bankruptcy and
foreclosure cases have many questions to answer: Regardless of our good
intentions,95 how can (or are) mediation and other “non-adjudicative” proce-
dures being used?  How do we want mediation and other non-adjudicative pro-
cedures involving third party neutrals to be used?  What protections or counter-
balances exist to help ensure the appropriate and ethical use of these proce-
dures?  What protections or counter-balances should exist?96
This hypothetical may seem fantastical.  It was, however, inspired by an
actual bankruptcy case in which the lawyers proposed the use of baseball arbi-
tration rather than mediation.  At least in some respects, the actual case is even
more fantastical than the hypothetical.97  This Article will now turn to that
case.
95 See Welsh, supra note 3, at 460 (observing that “[f]or reasons that now seem almost
sweetly naı¨ve, mediation advocates and program designers thought their (or more accurately,
our) good intentions would inoculate mediation from the challenges presented by reality”).
But see Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2009) (urging realism in judging the extent to which both litigation
and settlement have achieved their goals).
96 Some commentators are advising negotiators to rely on self-help measures rather than
assuming that ethics rules will be strengthened or enforced. See, e.g., Peter Reilly, Was
Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help, 24 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 481, 532 (2009) (advocating the strategic use of “come clean” questions at
critical moments and careful listening because responses to such questions may serve as the
basis for a claim of fraudulent non-disclosure).  There are parallels here to some commenta-
tors’ skepticism regarding the efficacy of using additional regulation to improve lawyers’
and mediators’ conduct in mediation. See, e.g., John Lande, Using Dispute System Design
Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50
UCLA L. REV. 69, 76 (2002) (opposing rules and sanctions to ensure good faith participa-
tion in mediation, instead urging courts to use dispute system design processes involving
stakeholder groups in designing and implementing policies that satisfy their interests, thus
building understanding of, and commitment to the integrity of mediation programs and
avoiding satellite litigation); Moffit, supra note 41, at 207, 224 (observing that “public back-
end mechanisms” for assuring mediator quality, such as enforcement of ethics rules, do not
work because mediation is generally an unlicensed activity and there are so many variations
in mediation practice; also urging that we “too often conflate the concepts of ‘progress’ and
‘regulation.’”).
97 For another example of a real life situation that rivals fiction, see E-mail from AALS
Dispute Resolution List on behalf of Jean Sternlight, Professor, UNLV Boyd Sch. of Law, to
aals-adr-l@po-missouri.edu (Jan. 11, 2011, 1:48 EST) (on file with author) (reporting that a
Texas hamburger restaurant had recently taped the following notice to its door: “By entering
these premises, you hereby agree to resolve any and all disputes or claims of any kind what-
soever, which arise from the products, services or premises, by way of binding arbitration,
not litigation.  No suit or action may be filed in any state or federal court.  Any arbitration
shall be governed by the FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, and administered by the Ameri-
can Mediation Association”; further reporting that review of the website of the American
Mediation Association suggested that its arbitral services were limited to the Dallas area and
personal injury or tort cases “with pleadings above $100,000”).
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III. THE REAL CASE OF IN RE AMERICAN CAPITAL EQUIPMENT, INC.
Skinner Engine Company (Skinner) was founded in Erie, Pennsylvania in
1868.98  In 1998, American Capital Equipment (American Capital) purchased
Ryco Holdings and, in the process, acquired an 86 percent ownership interest in
Skinner.99  At the conclusion of this transaction, Skinner was very highly lever-
aged.100  Unfortunately, the company did not perform as well as projected and
experienced difficulties in maintaining the cash flow required to meet its opera-
tional expenses and service its secured debt.101  Skinner also was unable to
meet the obligations imposed upon it under a put and call agreement that had
been part of American Capital’s purchase of Ryco Holdings.102  Further, Skin-
ner’s most significant creditor—PNC Bank—imposed limits on Skinner’s
access to credit.103  Skinner and American Capital sought Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation in April 2001.104
Skinner had had an illustrious history, designing and manufacturing
uniflow steam engines and engine components for merchant ships until the
1970s.105  Skinner used asbestos material in its designs and manufacturing
processes, and by the early 1980s, was being named as a defendant in personal
injury lawsuits brought by merchant marines alleging exposure to asbestos.106
At the time that Skinner filed for bankruptcy protection, more than 29,000
asbestos-related claims were pending against it.107  These claims represented
Skinner’s largest liability.108
98 See Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code Relating to
the Modified Chapter 11 Plan of Skinner Engine Company, Inc. Dated March 15, 2006, at 4,
In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 415 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 01-23987) [here-
inafter Disclosure Statement].
99 Id.  It appears that the remainder of Skinner’s stock was held by Fairchild Corporation.
Id.
100 According to Skinner’s Disclosure Statement:
To finance this purchase, pay the existing obligations of Ryco and Skinner and provide Skinner
with working capital, Skinner borrowed a total of $5,848,000 from PNC [Bank] and an addi-
tional $1,500,000 from Liberty BIDCO Investment Company.  As a result of these transactions,
the former owners of Ryco were paid $2,633,837 in cash at closing and received a note in the
original principal amount of $750,000.  In addition, Gerald Ryan and Richard Seidel, the former
owners of Ryco, were issued shares of preferred stock in Skinner, which they had the right to put
to American Capital pursuant to the terms of a Put and Call Agreement dated August 24, 1998.
Messrs. Ryan and Seidel, along with Edward Allegier, Eleanor Nevett and Robert M. Sok were
also granted a mortgage on property owned by Skinner at 337 W. 12th Street, Erie, Penn-
sylvania, in order to secure an obligation in the amount of $750,000 of American Capital to the
mortgagees and guaranteed by Skinner.
Id.
101 Id. at 5.
102 Apparently, Skinner was found liable for this obligation and judgment was entered
against it. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1.
105 Id. at 5.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. But see Objections of Travelers Casualty and Surety Company to the Modified Dis-
closure Statement Relating to the Modified Chapter 11 Plan of Skinner Engine Company,
Inc. Dated March 15, 2006 and Filed May 1, 2006, app. A, at 1-2, In re Am. Capital Equip.,
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In October 2003, upon the order of the bankruptcy court, Skinner sold
substantially all of its personal property to several purchasers for the sum of
$1,165,000.109  The bankruptcy court released these purchasers from any suc-
cessor liability for the asbestos-related claims against Skinner.110  PNC
received the funds and applied all but $35,000 of the purchase amount to its
secured claim against Skinner.111  By March 2006, Skinner estimated that its
most significant asset consisted of “the obligations owed by its insurers to
cover asbestos liabilities”112 and that the value of this insurance was “$11 mil-
lion in primary coverage and at least $135 million in excess coverage per
occurrence.”113  Skinner claimed that its coverage was based on many different
policies involving eleven different asbestos insurance companies.114
Over the course of several years, Skinner proposed five reorganization
plans to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania.115  Beginning with the third plan, proposed in 2004, Skinner incorpo-
rated a plan to distribute its assets—i.e., insurance proceeds—to the plaintiffs
in the outstanding asbestos-related lawsuits.116  The court did not approve this
reorganization plan.  By the fifth plan, Skinner specifically proposed the use of
ADR—modeled after baseball arbitration—to deal with the lawsuits.117  Ulti-
mately, in May 2009, the bankruptcy court found that Skinner’s fifth reorgani-
zation plan was unconfirmable, concluding that its ADR process was neither
reasonable nor entered into in good faith.118  The court also converted Skin-
ner’s and American Capital’s Chapter 11 reorganizations into Chapter 7 liqui-
dations.119  The United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy’s Court’s rulings.120
405 B.R. 415 (No. 01-23987) [hereinafter Objections of Travelers] (asserting that approxi-
mately 27,950 of these asbestos claims had been administratively dismissed in the multidis-
trict litigation process due to “lack of proof of asbestos-related impairment or medical
condition and exposure to a Skinner product” and that at the time of the Petition Date, only
about fifty asbestos-related claims were pending against Skinner).
109 Disclosure Statement, supra note 98, at 5.
110 Id.
111 Id.  Apparently, as security for its loans totaling $5,848,000, “PNC Bank took a first
priority security interest in substantially all of Skinner’s assets.”  Appellants’ Opening Brief
at 4, In re Am. Capital Equip., L.L.C., 2006 WL 5304204 (W.D. Pa. July 20, 2006) (Nos.
06-891, 06-892, 06-917).
112 Disclosure Statement, supra note 98, at 6.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 5-6.
115 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 5; In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405
B.R. 415, 427 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009).
116 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 8.
117 Objections of Travelers, supra note 108, at 4, 11.
118 In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 423.  I have described elsewhere the specifics of
the bankruptcy court’s objections to Skinner’s proposed “ADR Process.”  The bankruptcy
court understood Skinner’s proposed plan to include the use of both arbitration and media-
tion.  In actuality, the CADP involved only baseball arbitration. See Welsh, supra note 3, at
446-47.
119 In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 427.
120 Skinner Engine Co. v. Allianz Global Risk U.S. Ins. Co., No. 09-0886, 2010 WL
1337222, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010).
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The focus of this Article is on what lawyers should know as they select,
create and implement dispute resolution options—and why the inevitable pres-
sures of the bankruptcy and foreclosure context may hinder careful analysis and
decision-making.  Therefore, we will now turn to an exploration of exactly
what Skinner and American Capital proposed in their ADR Process, speculate a
bit about why they proposed what they did, and consider again the ethical
implications of In re American Capital Equipment, Inc.
A. The Emergence of the ADR Process
As noted supra, Skinner’s third plan first proposed a mechanism to deal
with the company’s potential liabilities as a result of the asbestos-related law-
suits.121  In particular, Skinner proposed the establishment of a trust under sec-
tion 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code to assume such liabilities.122  The trust was
to pay these claims using Skinner’s $35,000 in cash assets, the common stock
of the reorganized corporation, and any amounts received as a result of the
resolution of Skinner’s claims or causes of action against its insurers regarding
coverage for asbestos claims.123  Skinner’s insurers objected to this plan, argu-
ing that it provided the trust with control in contravention of the insurers’ “con-
tractual rights to defend, investigate, or settle these claims.”124  Ultimately, the
insurers charged that the third plan “sought to compel Skinner’s insurers to
fund the Trust, which would in turn divert a portion of the asbestos insurance
recoveries to pay the administrative and unsecured claims.”125  The court never
ruled on this plan because Skinner moved to stay the proceedings in order to
file a new plan.126
Skinner filed its fourth plan in November 2005.  This plan continued to
propose the establishment of a trust.127  But there were a couple of interesting
funding twists.  First, the fourth plan provided that the asbestos plaintiffs’ law
firm would “advance” $500,000 to fund the trust’s initial administrative
costs.128  Once plaintiffs’ personal injury claims were decided, 20 percent of
the funds they received from Skinner’s insurers would be used to fund the
continued administration of the claims procedure.129  The law firm would then
be reimbursed for its “advance” to the trust.130
121 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 8.
122 Id.
123 Joint Plan of Reorganization of Skinner Engine Company, Inc. Under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code at 1-2, 11, In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 415 (No. 01-
23988) (definition of “asbestos insurance action” and description of Trustee’s establishment
of Initial Payment Sum Percentage as an anchor to determine payments to plaintiffs).
124 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 9.
125 Id. But see Woodward, supra note 21, at 471 (describing how the Piper Aircraft Trust,
rather than the parties, funded the costs associated with the use of mediation).
126 See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 10.
127 See Summary Pursuant to Local Rule 3016-2 of the Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation of
Skinner Engine Company, Inc. at 1, In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 415 (No. 01-23987).
128 See id.
129 See id.
130 Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 111, at 11.
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The bankruptcy court held a lengthy hearing on this plan on January 10,
2006.131  The discussions between the judge and lawyers quickly turned to the
processes being proposed to decide claims and fund the resolution of the asbes-
tos claims.132  Skinner’s counsel described the claims process as “a mechanism,
as has been done in every major class action in every asbestos case.”133  Judge
McCullough derided the process as “a scheme.”134  He worried that the pro-
posed funding of the reorganization was speculative,135 that Skinner was not
statutorily permitted to use a trust mechanism in a reorganization,136 and that
the proposed procedures had not been tested.137  Skinner’s counsel was consist-
ently ready to respond to the concerns raised by the Judge and the insurers,
indicating willingness to amend the plan to provide for a “claims administrator”
rather than a “trustee”138 and to place a cap on the insurers’ potential
liability.139
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the judge, meanwhile, engaged in a nearly-heart-
breaking colloquy as plaintiffs’ counsel tried to persuade the judge that the
131 See Transcript of Hearing on Jan. 10, 2006, In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. 415
(Nos. 01-23987 & 01-23988) [hereinafter Jan. 10 Transcript].
132 See id. at 9.
133 Id. at 11.
134 Id.  Meanwhile, counsel for the insurers, debtors, and asbestos plaintiffs traded self-
interested bootstrapping charges, and all of these charges were probably legitimate. See,
e.g., id. at 33-34 (one of insurers’ counsel urged, “What’s happening in the case is the
bankruptcy process is being used to take the claims that outside of bankruptcy are not gener-
ating value for these claimants, and it’s creating value for them by allowing them, and using
that allowance as a lever in coverage litigation.  That’s what’s happening.  That is obtaining
litigation advantage, plain and simple.”); id. at 48-49 (one of plaintiffs’ counsel explained to
the court, “Judge, if you go and you look at the numbers of the multi-district Court, the
number of cases that are being remanded and being tried are very, very small [estimates of
10-20 per year]. . . .  We had four to 500 [asbestos-related cancer] cases that were set for trial
when the multi-district Court order came out in 1991.  It wasn’t our idea and we opposed it.
And if you want to talk about a litigation advantage, the fact of the matter is is [sic] that the
litigation advantage for the MDL rests with the insurers because they get to sit back and
watch.”); id. at 73 (another one of plaintiffs’ counsel criticized the insurers’ unwillingness to
participate in the development of the claims process, pointing out, “They have a veto. . . .
[W]e went out and got the most independently constructed state-of-the-art settlement stan-
dards from Manville [sic], put together by that Court, and said these are our standards. . . .
And you’re not getting them to go for that.  What can you do when someone doesn’t want to
say yes? . . .  And we’re not trying to change or enlarge anybody’s contractual rights.  All
this plan does is attempt to enforce them, period, on a level—getting a level playing field,
we’re just enforcing your contractual rights.  That’s not a litigation advantage, unless some-
body thinks that your role in life is to be a victim, stuck in a dead end, going nowhere.”).
135 See id. at 18.
136 Insurers’ counsel had urged that, in Chapter 11, the proposed reorganization had to “cre-
ate or preserve some value that would otherwise be lost, not merely distributed to a different
stakeholder outside of bankruptcy” and that this was “what the Third Circuit calls the bound-
ary between fulfilling the purposes of Chapter 11 and the perversion of those purposes.” Id.
at 37-38.  The legitimacy of these claims is beyond the scope of this Article, though it seems
that a key question is whether or not the asbestos plaintiffs whose claims had not yet been
decided or settled—apparently languishing for decades in the multi-district litigation pro-
cess—would be considered stakeholders or creditors under bankruptcy law principles.
137 See id. at 25.
138 See id. at 20.
139 See id. at 12.
Spring 2011] INTEGRATING ADR INTO BANKRUPTCY 423
claims process proposed by Skinner was essential due to the difficulties and
delay involved in navigating the various and uncertain requirements imposed
by the multi-district litigation process, the particular judges administering that
process, and the jurisdictional limits of the bankruptcy court.140  In response,
Judge McCullough proposed trying ninety of the asbestos claims in his own
140 See id. at 41-51.  I will quote here from just one portion of this transcript:
Mr. Campbell: You go down there [to the multi-district litigation (MDL) process] and it’s sup-
posed to be some highly coordinated effort at doing discovery and coordinating
discovery.
The Court: So you’re saying those Judges are crazy?
Mr. Campbell: It’s a dead end.
The Court: You’re saying those Judges are crazy?
Mr. Campbell: I don’t say that the Judges are crazy.  I don’t even think there’s a Judge
assigned to it at this point.  The man that was handling it has passed away.  But
it doesn’t move.  Now, all we’re trying to do is sort out the good claims, find
the valid claims.  And I know and I’ve listened to you today, and I know that
you’re skeptical about them, but there are good claims here.  Let’s presume
there are.  We must presume that there may be good claims.  We cannot assume
there are no good claims.  We have—
The Court: I’m assuming that somebody can look at somebody and see if they’re dying.
That’s a good claim.
Mr. Campbell: Well, they have to be dying.  It has to be a disease that is caused by asbestos,
and there has to be some—
The Court: I understand. And—
Mr. Campbell: —exposure.
The Court: And why can’t that just go through the—if there’s only 20, or 30, or 40, or
whatever Mr. Kellman said, I don’t think—the District Courts are a little bit
overworked, but I don’t think they are so overworked they can’t take on
another 30 or 40 cases.
Mr. Campbell: They don’t move.  You don’t get out of the MDL.  It’s not being done.  That’s
where you’re being unrealistic, and Pollyanna-ish, and naive.  I hate to say it,
but it’s true.
Id. at 70-72.  If the colloquy quoted here accurately reflects the plight of asbestos claimants
who are suffering from cancer and then find themselves caught among the complex and
conflicting requirements of the MDL process, the bankruptcy process, and the self-interest of
all of the professionals involved in the resolution of their claims, there is tragedy here that is
eminently deserving of academic and media scrutiny—as well as legislative, executive, judi-
cial and industry reform.  At the same time, it is essential to recall that there are two sides (at
least) to nearly every story. See Objections of Travelers, supra note 108, app. A, at 1
(describing administrative dismissal of claims made by the Maritime Asbestos Legal Clinic
due to “the inability or refusal of the asbestos claimants to comply with orders issued by
Judge Weiner in 1995 that required claimants to provide certain proof of an asbestos-related
condition and exposure to a defendant’s products”).  The requirement of “proof of exposure”
could have been particularly challenging if these claimants had not yet gained access to the
sort of information only gained through discovery.  It also may be worthwhile to reflect on
the difficulty of relying entirely on the courts to resolve polycentric human and environmen-
tal tragedies grounded in the uncertainties of technological advancement.  When the judici-
ary is the governmental branch designated to make a judgment and declare a remedy, there
must be someone identified as the blameworthy one. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978) (regarding courts’ ability to
handle polycentric disputes); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW 180, 206, 233-42 (2001) (discussing alternative bureaucratic approaches to
handling social needs—though even Western European countries appear to be re-thinking
their social safety net in light of the worldwide economic downturn).
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court.141  When it appeared that this was not procedurally feasible,142 debtors’
and plaintiffs’ counsel offered to make another set of revisions to the reorgani-
zation plan with the goal of using bankruptcy to “try to get the value from the
people that have the value to the people who need the value”143 by requiring
the insurers to consider individual claims and giving the court the ability to
override an insurer’s veto if appropriate.144
Not surprisingly, insurers’ counsel objected to this plan of action, focusing
on the 20 percent surcharge on the plaintiffs145 and the plan’s alleged inconsis-
tency with “a Chapter 11 purpose,”146 and urging that perhaps a “hardworking
and innovative” Chapter 7 trustee might develop a sensible distributional
scheme in collaboration with the insurers.147  The insurers’ counsel objected
strenuously to the emergence of such a scheme from “a Chapter 11 debtor-in-
possession in a case in which the gat[e-keep]ing question about whether you’re
doing anything more than distributing assets[—i.e.,] are you maximizing value
without creating litigation advantage[—]just can’t be answered.”148  All of
these objections were for naught.  Apparently, Judge McCollough had been
moved by what he heard during this lengthy hearing:
Let me just tell you, I’m sympathetic with your [insurers’] arguments, but I’m also
sympathetic with where the debtor comes from.  And I’m also a little tired of hearing
this has been going on for 25 years, because the insurance companies have screwed
the dog, and so ha[s] the debtor.  Okay?  And I’m looking for a little bit of a chance
for some—a little creative thinking, and see if there’s some way to get around the log
jam that we apparently have.  And I don’t think you really mind, as a lawyer, to
charge your clients for a little more time to see if we can come to that end of that log
jam.149
Later, in response to the objections of another insurer’s counsel that this case
was “not like any other asbestos bankruptcy case” and that it was “based on a
novel theory” and “completely unorthodox,” Judge McCollough pointed out,
“That’s how new law gets [developed]. . . . [H]ow do you think the Johns
141 See Jan. 10 Transcript, supra note 131, at 74.
142 See id. at 75.
143 Id. at 76.
144 See id. at 76-77.
145 They described it as an attempt to “rewrite the [insurance] contract and insert adminis-
trative claimants, priority claimants, and other non-asbestos unsecured creditors as benefi-
ciaries to the insurance policies.” Id. at 77.  A different counsel urged that debtors’ counsel
should be required to develop a liquidation analysis under Chapter 7 saying, “[W]e think that
what that’s going to show is that the administrative creditors obviously will fare much better
under the Chapter 11 [reorganization] than under the Chapter 7 liquidation, and there are
certain potential conflicts of interest that arise that ought to be fleshed out in the disclosure
statement.” Id. at 96.  This argument is somewhat reminiscent of Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S.
1, 4-5 (1985), in which defendants successfully argued that because the plaintiff rejected a
Rule 68 settlement offer that exceeded the ultimate judgment he received, they were not
responsible for the payment of plaintiff’s post-offer attorneys fees pursuant to the relevant
fee-shifting statute.
146 Jan. 10 Transcript, supra note 131, at 82.  The insurers’ counsel also acknowledged,
though, that the “distributional scheme” proposed by the debtors’ and plaintiffs’ counsel
might be “sensible” or “creative.” Id.
147 Id. at 83.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 83-84.
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Mansville case ever got resolved?  Somebody actually thought about it, and
they came up with a theory that was not 524(g).  524(g) came out of Mansville.
So, give creative man an option[.]”150  The Judge added encouragement to all
counsel to talk with each other before submitting the next plan151 and by the
end of the hearing, it appeared that all of the lawyers were committed to being
collaborative and creative.152
In Spring 2006, Skinner filed its fifth and final reorganization plan, with a
variety of complex and interconnected provisions in a proposed Court
Approved Distribution Procedure for Asbestos Claims Against Skinner Engine
Company, Inc. (CADP).153  These provisions apparently were designed to be
responsive to the court’s encouragement of creative problem solving.  Specifi-
cally, the CADP provided that the asbestos plaintiffs would be given the oppor-
tunity to opt into the CADP or opt out “and enter the tort system.”154  If they
opted into the CADP, they would be required to pay a filing fee to participate in
the CADP.155  If their claim qualified for categorization as one of seven
“Scheduled Diseases,” they could elect to accept the “Scheduled Value” for
that disease or receive an “Individual Evaluation” of their claims by the Plan
Trustee,156 and they would receive a share of the Scheduled Value (or, presum-
ably, the Individual Evaluation) based on a percentage set by the Plan
Trustee.157
An insurer, however, could dispute the Plan Trustee’s categorization of a
claim and seek a “Court Determination of the Individual Evaluation.”158  The
court’s “Determination” was to be made “solely on the basis of the documenta-
tion in the Asbestos Claim file when the Asbestos Claim was categorized” by
the Plan Trustee.159  If the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the
court could then be asked to approve either the value of the claim as determined
by the Plan Trustee or an amount contained in a counter-offer from the insurer,
which could be “any or no amount.”160  According to a footnote in the CADP,
this provision was modeled after baseball arbitration:
This process is similar to “baseball arbitration” in that the Bankruptcy Court may
select either the amount proposed by the Plan Trustee or the counteroffer of the
Asbestos Insurance Company.  The Bankruptcy Court may not select another amount
as part of the Court Determination.  The process does not affect the Bankruptcy
Court’s discretion to award counsel fees under this section.161
150 Id. at 94-95.
151 See id. at 98.
152 See id. at 104.
153 Court Approved Distribution Procedures for Asbestos Claims Against Skinner Engine
Company, Inc. at 1, In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 415 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009)
(No. 1-23987) [hereinafter CADP].
154 Id.
155 Id. at 2.
156 Id. at 1.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 3.
159 Id.; see Objections of Travelers, supra note 108, at 11 (objecting to CADP’s failure to
specify what would be contained in the Asbestos Claim file).
160 CADP, supra note 153, at 9.
161 Id. at 9, n.8.
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Baseball arbitration is a relatively well-known model of arbitration.  In it,
the parties make their “last best offers,” and the arbitrator must choose one or
the other.162  The process is designed to motivate the parties to be as realistic as
possible.163  The arbitrator may know the parties’ numbers ahead of time or
may not (“night baseball”)164  If the arbitrator knows the numbers ahead of
time, she will choose the number that she feels is fairer at the conclusion of the
arbitration hearing.165  If she does not know the numbers, she will arrive at her
own arbitral award and then conform her award to the party-provided number
that is closer to hers.166
The reorganization plan continued to provide for a 20 percent surcharge to
be paid by the plaintiffs.167  In addition, as suggested supra, the CADP also
provided for the shifting of attorneys’ fees if the court determined that:
an Asbestos Claimant or an Asbestos Insurance Company, and/or their respective
counsel, has contested an Asbestos Claim in bad faith or as part of bad faith conduct
with respect to Asbestos Claims and their resolution and/or determination, which
conduct includes, but is not limited to, the repeated filing of frivolous requests for
Court Determinations, the relitigation through Court Determinations of the same fac-
tual issues, such as the use of Skinner products on a particular vessel, in a particular
location and/or at a particular time and/or a history of requests for Court Determina-
tions that deviate from normal requests for the review of Asbestos Claims.168
No hearing was held on the fifth plan for reorganization until May 7,
2009.169  Counsel for one insurer quickly alleged “collusion.”170  Judge
162 See Meth, supra note 30, at 384; John L. Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball Arbitration After 20
Years, DISP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at 42, 43.
163 See Meth, supra note 30, at 388.
164 Gerald Lebovits & Lucero Ramirez Hidalgo, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Real
Estate Matters: The New York Experience, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 437, 442
(2010).
165 See Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 167, 203
(2001).
166 See id.
167 See Objections of Travelers, supra note 108, at 33-34 (alleging that surcharge was
designed to pay debtors’ lawyers and other Chapter 11 professionals “who would otherwise
recover an extremely small fraction of their fees”).
168 CADP, supra note 153, at 9.
169 According to the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re American Capital Equipment, L.L.C.,
296 Fed. App’x 270, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2008), there was considerable activity in the approxi-
mately three years that elapsed from the filing of the fifth reorganization plan until this
hearing.  Apparently and somewhat inexplicably, the third reorganization plan was put to a
vote with the following results:
Skinner’s unsecured creditors and asbestos claimants voted in support of this plan.  Skinner’s
insurers then initiated an adversary proceeding alleging that such an arrangement violated their
contractual rights under the insurance policies.
. . . Appellants [insurers] filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 petitions, arguing that the case
no longer served a legitimate purpose under Chapter 11[,] and . . . alleged that the plan was not
designed to maximize the value of the assets to the creditors, but instead was designed to gain an
improper litigation advantage over the insurers by allowing the asbestos claimants to use trun-
cated, court-monitored procedures to access the insurance policies in exchange for claimants’
agreement to hand over a portion of their insurance recoveries to other non-asbestos creditors.
Following a series of hearings, the Bankruptcy Court ultimately issued an order denying the
motion and staying the proceedings pending appeal.  Appellants appealed the Bankruptcy
Court’s order denying the motion to dismiss to the District Court.  In a May 11, 2007 order, the
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McCullough questioned Skinner’s settlement with the asbestos claimants
“when there’s nothing to insure, there’s never been a claim successfully
brought against the company, and there’s not even a piece of paper that sug-
gests they have a valid claim.”171  Perhaps most telling, however, was the col-
loquy regarding the judge’s potential role in the dispute resolution process,
modeled after baseball arbitration, that had suddenly appeared as an integral
part of the CADP:
Ms. Alcabes: [I]t sets up, you know, this novel baseball arbitration procedure
which we just don’t think can possibly work or stand up to any kind
of judicial scrutiny.
The Court: While we’re at the baseball—where in the law does it say you can
tell me as the Court what to do and what I can’t do and what I can
see and what I can’t see.  Where is there any case law that says that
. . . ?
[I]t says in there that I can only consider certain pieces of paper, I
can only consider certain stuff, and then I only get to choose
between A and B.
Ms. Alcabes: Your Honor, that was an attempt—this Court raised issues about the
way claims would be processed, and I think, if I recall correctly, the
Court asked to be involved in the process and asked that the insur-
ance companies be involved in the process.  And that was an
attempt on our part to involve the Court and the insurance compa-
nies in the process.  And the client plan also leaves open the ability
of the Court to add more procedures or more . . . requirements.
The Court: Not the way I read it.
Ms. Alcabes: You’re allowed to pick the trustee and you’re allowed to set a lot of
the terms about how the claims are handled and processed through
your court.
The Court: Not the way I read it.  It says I can and I can’t.
Ms. Alcabes: It was just our attempt to comply with what you had asked for when
we revised the plan.
The Court: And then at the end of Section A of that thing, the last sentence
says, “And the asbestos insurance company shall have the right to
seek a Court determination of the asbestos claims.”  What’s the dif-
ference between a Court determination and a trial?
Ms. Alcabes: Well, these claims are being settled, they’re not being tried.
The Court: Oh.  You’re putting up a bunch of paper, you’re putting up an
agreement, you’re putting up a proposed settlement, and I’m sup-
posed to determine it.  What’s the difference between that and a trial
. . . ?
District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss,
finding that the plan maximized value to creditors and was not filed solely to gain a litigation
advantage over creditors, and concluding that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to dismiss Debtors’ Chapter 11 case for a lack of good faith.  This timely appeal [to
the Third Circuit] followed.
Id. (emphasis added).  The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court. Id. at 272.
170 Transcript of Hearing on May 7, 2009, at 6-7, In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R.
415 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 01-23987) [hereinafter May 7 Transcript].
171 Id. at 7.
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Mr. Horkovich: We did not mean to burden the Court.  The Court has expressed
grave concerns on numerous occasions that this was not a fair pro-
cess and that the process is improper.  So we tried to involve the
Court to try to address the Court’s concerns[, for] example on the
selection of the trustee[.  I]f we just selected the trustee, then it
might be seen as, Your Honor, as collusive or such other terms as
Your Honor has used with regard to the plan proponents’ position.
So we tried to leave that up to Your Honor, to the Court.  If our
selection of the trustee is a scam, then if Your Honor could select a
trustee, then maybe that would address Your Honor’s concern.
. . . .
. . . [W]e did our best to try to craft a procedure that would be more
expeditious, relieve the judicial system of the burden and yet
address Your Honor’s concerns about lack of judicial involvement
and review.172
Judge McCullough returned to this point, regarding his involvement, later on:
The Court: In Section 2A of this document, “If a Court determination is elected,
the Bankruptcy Court shall decide—shall decide—solely, solely on
the basis of the documentation in the asbestos claim file when the
asbestos claim was categorized, whether the asbestos claim should
be categorized as a scheduled disease.”  Where do you get off tell-
ing me what I can decide and what I can’t decide on?
Mr. Horkovich: No disrespect, Your Honor.  And Your Honor can—
The Court: It’s not a matter of disrespect.  I’m just saying where in the law does
it say you can tell a Judge what he can decide on?
Mr. Horkovich: Well, Your Honor can look at whatever evidence Your Honor
would want to look at.  The intent behind submitting this document
was that this would be a settlement which would structure—mini-
mize the burden on the Court, minimize the burden on the parties as
part of that settlement.
The Court: And kind of screw some people out of their rights.173
Again, Judge McCullough returned to the uncomfortable fit between the terms
proposed by Skinner and the role of a public judge.  The resulting exchange
highlighted the contrast between a private arbitrator and a public judge, particu-
larly in terms of neutrals’ autonomy from the will of individual parties.  The
exchange also suggested the difference between the procedural reforms that are
possible when all parties agree compared to the much more limited possibilities
that exist when a less powerful party attempts to impose a set of procedures
upon a more powerful party:174
172 Id. at 8-12.
173 Id. at 15.
174 I make this observation due to the strikingly greater deference shown by courts to the
pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provisions imposed by institutional actors upon consum-
ers, employees, franchisees, individual securities investors, etc. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S.
79, 83 (2002); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  Courts have, however, become
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The Court: Okay.  Then at the top of Page 3, it says, “If the Bankruptcy Court
agrees with the asbestos claimants’ position, the decision shall be
binding against the asbestos claimant and the asbestos insurance
companies and not subject to further review.”  How can you limit
the further review, Number one?  Number two, there’s no discus-
sion about what happens if the Bankruptcy Court disagrees.
Mr. Horkovich: If this were not—if the Court were not involved, if you could just
imagine that for a second.  If there was a separate settlement and
agreement, parties could agree in a settlement to an arbitration and
certain limitations.  A limited number of witnesses, a limited num-
ber of papers that would be presented.  A limited time for presenta-
tion—
The Court: That’s if both parties, both sides were parties were parties to the
agreement.  If you had the insurance company’s agreement, I’d
agree with you.  But that’s not what you’ve got here.
Mr. Horkovich: Absolutely not.  That’s correct, Your Honor.  So then the issue is,
can we do that without their consent or their involvement?  Our
respectful belief is that we can if the plan is reasonable.  If the set-
tlement is reasonable, we’re able to—
The Court: Let me tell you, with no basis for any claim here, nothing to insure,
no prior claim being paid, I’m going to tell you I don’t see any basis
to find it reasonable.175
Near the end of the hearing, Judge McCullough tried to understand what he was
being asked to do one more time:
The Court: I understand that the plan proponents’ distinction between trying a
case and determining a case is that I’m not being asked to have a
trial, I’m just asked to determine it.  That’s the distinction?
Mr. Horkovich: Yes, Your Honor.  This would be a settlement rather than a trial
with a judgment. And Your Honor’s determination—
The Court: No, no, no.  That’s not what the document says.  The document says
I shall determine.  It doesn’t say I shall approve or disapprove a
settlement.  It says I shall determine.
Mr. Horkovich: The word determine has no special meaning to us, Your Honor.
more willing to find unconscionability. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconsciona-
bility’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 94 n.170 (2006); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis
as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 761-62
(2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 383, 401 nn.44-45 (2008).  The recent Supreme Court decision in Rent-a-Center, West,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), however, may effectively end this development.
See Jean R. Sternlight, The Role of Courts in Interpreting and Enforcing Arbitration Clauses:
A Process Viewed Through Two Different Lenses 2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (anticipating that Rent-A-Center will remove unconscionability determina-
tions from courts and place them in the hands of the same arbitrators who will conduct the
arbitration proceedings).
175 May 7 Transcript, supra note 170, at 16-17; see also id. at 18-20 (counsel returning to
parties’ ability to reach agreement on the procedures that will be used to determine liability
and damages—including limitations on evidence, witnesses, and range of the award—with-
out their insurers’ consent; also referencing procedures used by insurance companies pursu-
ant to the Wellington Agreement).
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The Court: Okay, then what word would you substitute for determine?
Mr. Horkovich: Decide, approve, disapprove, whatever word—176
As noted supra, in baseball arbitration, the arbitrator subordinates her
judgment regarding the right arbitral award to the judgment of the parties in
making their last best offers.  This approach is clearly appropriate in an arbitra-
tion that is the creature of a contract between informed and sophisticated par-
ties.  But can litigating parties agree between themselves to force a publicly
appointed judge to decide in this way?  Dubious.  Could one party force this
form of dispute resolution upon another unwilling party and upon a publicly
appointed judge?  In this case, at least, the answer was no.  In the Skinner
bankruptcy, one of the insurers’ counsel reminded everyone of the limitations
imposed by the law:
[T]heir fifth plan, which is neither really a settlement under 9019 nor really a claims
allowance process under 502 is really a stranger to the [Bankruptcy C]ode.  One
could go through the process of allowance or disallowance of claims in which the
Court has the role that the code gives it subject to everyone’s rights.  Or there could
be a settlement.  What they’ve done is neither, and that is one of the many reasons
why the fifth plan is unconfirmable.177
One other problem with the plan was, of course, the 20 percent surcharge.
Though debtors’ counsel were willing to reduce the percentage of the
surcharge, they were unwilling to abandon it.178
Ultimately, in his May 26, 2009 opinion, Judge McCullough labeled the
proposed CADP “collusion”179 and found that Skinner’s reorganization plan
was “unconfirmable” without the insurers’ consent.180  He therefore converted
Skinner’s Chapter 11 reorganization into a Chapter 7 liquidation.181  Judge
McCullough also rejected the CADP’s attempt to provide for his service as “an
arbitrator, mediator, or something else”182 responsible for “mak[ing] final bind-
ing determinations as to the validity and valuation of contested opt-in Asbestos
176 Id. at 25-26.
177 Id. at 23; see also Great American Insurance Company’s Objections to Debtors’ Disclo-
sure Statement & Joinder in Other Parties’ Objections and Renewed Motion to Dismiss at
10, In re Am. Capital Equip., Inc., 405 B.R. 415 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 01-23987)
(quoting Myers v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996)) (urging that under
Bankruptcy Rule 9019, the following four factors must be considered in determining
whether to approve a settlement: “1. the probability of success in the litigation; 2. the likely
difficulties in collection; 3. the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, incon-
venience and delay necessarily attending it; and 4. the paramount interest of the creditors.”).
178 May 7 Transcript, supra note 170, at 25.
179 In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 423
180 Id. at 426-27 (concluding that a confirmable plan could not be effectuated because of
failure to obtain Insurers’ consent, among other reasons).
181 Id. at 427.  Debtors who have run out of cash before their plan can be confirmed may
themselves seek to convert their Chapter 11 bankruptcy into a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. See 11
U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4) (2006) (listing causes for conversion of case under chapter 7).  That
does not seem to have been the case here. See In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426-27
(stating conversion to Chapter 7 was appropriate due to inability to effectuate confirmable
plan).
182 See In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426.
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Claims”183 and thus “finally liquidat[ing] such claims, and without any chance
for review by another court.”184  As suggested by Judge McCullough’s ques-
tions during the hearings, the jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy courts is lim-
ited.  Though parties may explicitly consent (or at least not object) to a
bankruptcy judge’s exercise of extra-jurisdictional service,185 such consent
apparently did not occur here.  Therefore, the sorts of claims that had been
brought by the asbestos claimants186 represented “noncore proceedings”187—
and as Judge McCullough went on to observe: “[T]he Court may only issue
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court with
respect to noncore proceedings . . . this Court is powerless to make a final
determination regarding the liquidation of any opt-in Asbestos Claims that are
disputed . . . .”188
Procedures and titles seemed to mean so little to counsel for the debtors
and plaintiffs in the Skinner bankruptcy.  A “trustee” could just as easily be
called “claims administrator.”  “Determine” could become “approve.”  A
“judge” could convert into a “baseball arbitrator.”  Even Judge McCullough
revealed a lack of understanding regarding the procedures involved, observing
that he was being asked to play the role of “arbitrator, mediator, or something
else.”189  The debtors’ and plaintiffs’ counsel definitely wanted the asbestos
cases to be heard and decided—regardless of the procedures used.  The insur-
ers’ counsel were just as adamant in not wanting the cases to be heard.  Judge
McCullough wanted to resolve this matter and was worried about the deserving
asbestos plaintiffs whose claims had never been heard.
But procedure matters, and the words used to prescribe procedures matter.
Lawyers should know better than most that different words can lead to different
expectations, duties, and entitlements.  In the end, Judge McCullough found
that:
Unfortunately for the Debtor and the Co-Proponents, this Court is unaware of any
legal authority that would permit it to so act [as proposed in the Fifth Plan] while, at
the same time, it also acts as the presiding Court.  Furthermore, the relevant provi-
sions of the Fifth Plan and CADP cited to above refer to this Court as “the Bank-
183 Id. at 425 (“[P]rovisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process repeatedly call
for this Court, in its official capacity, to make final binding determinations as to the validity
and valuation of contested opt-in Asbestos Claims . . . .”).
184 Id. at 425.
185 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
186 See In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426.
187 Id. at 425 (“[T]he liquidation of unliquidated personal injury tort claims, as are the opt-
in Asbestos Claims, constitute(s) a noncore proceeding . . . .”).
188 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006) (“Core proceedings include, but are not limited to
. . . allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of
the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan . . . but
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort[s] . . . .”).
It is conceivable, but beyond the scope of this Article, that the debtor and its co-proponents
may have claimed that an exception applied. See, e.g., In re UAL Corp., 310 B.R. 373, 379-
80 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) (defining the bankruptcy court’s decision to time-bar a personal
injury claim as the broad view of the liquidation exception because it “effectively liqui-
date[d] the claim for purposes of distribution” and defining the narrow view as specifically
“fixing the amount of the claim”).
189 In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 426.
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ruptcy Court” when it makes its final determinations thereunder, which indicates to
the Court that the Debtor and the Co-Proponents expect that this Court, when making
final determinations within the confines of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Pro-
cess, will only act within its official capacity as the presiding Court in the instant
bankruptcy case.  Acting in such official capacity, this Court, as set forth above, may
not finally liquidate contested opt-in Asbestos Claims, and even to the extent that it
can act with respect to such claims, such action will necessarily be reviewable by
another court.190
Arguably, Judge McCullough invited just the sort of creativity that counsel
demonstrated here.  He sought innovation and noted that creative lawyers are
the source of new law; he himself indicated a willingness to try asbestos cases;
he urged all counsel to work together to try to respond to the plight of worthy
plaintiffs.  In the end, though, counsel’s creative problem solving crossed too
many boundaries.
IV. GUESSING AT THE UNDERLYING DYNAMICS THAT LED TO A PROPOSED
“CREATIVE” AND “ALTERNATIVE” SOLUTION
It is so tempting to guess at the underlying dynamics that led to the proce-
dures proposed in In re Skinner Engine Company, Inc.  The pleadings and hear-
ings suggest the following: Debtors’ counsel had not been paid all of their fees
due to the insurers’ decision to contest coverage and thus had an interest in
“monetizing” Skinner’s insurance policies.191 The Chapter 11 professionals,
including debtors’ counsel, may even have been forced to disgorge some of the
fees they had received if the reorganization was converted into a Chapter 7
liquidation.192 The multi-district litigation process had failed to serve the plain-
tiffs in the asbestos cases, or Skinner as one of the defendants, in part because
there were so many cases and the responsible judge had died.193  The insurers
had calculated that payment to the asbestos plaintiffs on behalf of Skinner
would be so small and unlikely that it did not make economic sense to partici-
pate in a creative dispute resolution procedure.  If these guesses regarding the
dynamics are accurate, the proposed CADP in Skinner could be understood as a
creative work-around, developed by desperate lawyers trying to do their best to
achieve their clients’ various and difficult interests.  The CADP borrowed
heavily from the operation of trusts established in several other noteworthy
bankruptcies, particularly in the definition of Scheduled Diseases and the valu-
ation of claims.  The dispute resolution procedure in the CADP, its financing
and the involvement of the judge, however, were new.
Unfortunately, the lawyers’ procedural innovations were insufficiently
informed.  The lawyers—and even the bankruptcy judge—did not appear to
190 See id.  In a footnote, the court observed that the debtor and its co-proponents could
simply remove the court from the ADR Process and thus “rectify the flaw that the Court has
just identified regarding such process.” Id. at 426 n.6.  But the court added, “However, such
removal of the Court would serve to make the Asbestos Claims Settlement, which incorpo-
rates the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, even more unreasonable than it has already
been determined to be by the Court.” Id.
191 See Jan. 10 Transcript, supra note 131, at 90-92.
192 See Objections of Travelers, supra note 108, at 35-36.
193 See id. app. A, at 2; Jan. 10 Transcript, supra note 131, at 45-49.
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consider all of Skinner’s dispute resolution options, the consequences of such
options, and their appropriate relationship with the public institution of the fed-
eral bankruptcy courts.  It is likely that they did not have enough time or money
to do the careful research, analysis, and consultation that might have resulted in
a better, potentially confirmable, plan.  This dynamic seems likely to character-
ize many bankruptcies and foreclosures—and likely to result in the sorts of
difficult, largely-unanswered ethical questions raised in this Article’s discus-
sion of the troubles of the hypothetical XYZ Company.
The lawyers’ and the judge’s apparent lack of knowledge regarding availa-
ble dispute resolution options did not need to exist.  Legal educators and regu-
lators, for example, can and should do more to prevent the occurrence of
another In re Skinner Engine Company, Inc.  As noted supra, some law schools
now integrate dispute resolution (and even dispute system design) into their
core and elective doctrinal courses, regardless of whether students plan to pur-
sue litigation, transactional work, or careers in business or government.  Not
surprisingly, integration is more widespread in some doctrinal areas than
others.  In part, this may be due to the availability of helpful resources.  Many
civil procedure texts, for example, now include sections that introduce “alterna-
tive” court-connected dispute resolution processes.194  Not all civil procedure
professors, however, teach these sections.  In addition, the texts’ coverage of
the topic can be spotty, and the focus sometimes tends toward assessing
whether the inclusion of these processes in civil litigation is “good” or “bad.”
Frankly, such a framing is no longer relevant.  Dispute resolution procedures
are here to stay, as integral parts of civil litigators’ practice.  Law students need
to learn enough about the variety of available dispute resolution procedures to
ensure their ability to engage in knowledgeable, skillful and ethical practice195
in all of these forums.  Ideally, inclusion of this topic will also help law stu-
dents understand how to use the processes in a manner that will be consistent
with the important mission and ethics of serving as “officer[s] of the legal sys-
tem and . . . public citizen[s] having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.”196
Law schools, meanwhile, are much more likely to invest in courses that
introduce students to dispute resolution if states intentionally include this topic
in their bar exams.  Such a reform need not be difficult.  Essay questions may
194 See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND
CONTEXT 577-607 (3d ed. 2008).
195 See ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A
ROAD MAP 8-9 (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 114 (2007) (calling for law schools to introduce programs and
revise their curricula to integrate the cognitive skills of legal analysis, the humanistic skills
of client service, and the internalization of the identity and moral values of civil
professionals).
196 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2009).  Consistent with this goal and
under the leadership of Professors John Lande, Jean Sternlight, and Sean Nolon, the ABA
Section of Dispute Resolution has begun an initiative to provide traditional, “podium” civil
procedure professors with a range of easily-accessible, customized tools to assist with the
incorporation of dispute resolution procedures, problem-solving skills and a humanistic
approach to the practice of law into doctrinal courses.  As part of this initiative, interested
academics have also formed other committees focusing on other doctrinal areas.
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arise out of events occurring in a negotiation, judicial settlement conference,
mediation session, med-arb or arbitration hearing.  Bar questions may focus on
issues covered in doctrinal courses as varied as civil procedure, evidence, con-
tracts, employment discrimination, or remedies, just to name a few—but the
events’ occurrence within a dispute resolution process also will require students
to know the relevant law and ethics that apply there.197
Hopefully, this Article has also illustrated why and how the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct need to be updated to respond to the real dilem-
mas arising in today’s mediation sessions and other court-connected non-adju-
dicative processes.  During the Ethics 2000 process, Professors Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Kimberlee Kovach, Robert Cochran, and Doug Yarn, as well as Dean
Jim Alfini, current ABA Dispute Resolution Section Chair Wayne Thorpe, and
others, advocated for dispute resolution-related changes.198  Many of their pro-
posals were not adopted, or adopted only in part.  They foresaw some of the
difficulties that have now arisen.  Timing is everything, and now may be the
time to revisit these pragmatic visionaries’ proposals.
Finally, mediation advocates (including this author) need to inform our-
selves about the worlds we propose to enter.  To return to the focus of this
Article, that means learning about the substantive and procedural law of bank-
ruptcy and both the goals and limits (legal, ethical and practical) of the domi-
nant players in bankruptcy.  We can—and probably will—still advocate for
procedural reform and inclusion of new forms of dispute resolution, but we
can—and should—be informed advocates.199  It is what we expect of our chil-
dren, employees, and students.  We should lead by example.  It is so much
work, though, to behave as we should.  Indeed, it is often a thankless task and,
even worse, one that is likely to draw criticism from those who are sufficiently
content with the status quo.
197 The Pennsylvania Bar Association Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee recently
proposed to the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners that the state’s bar exam include
ADR.  See Memorandum from Herbert R. Nurick, Chair of the Subcomm. on Legislation &
Policy of the Pa. Bar Ass’n Alternative Dispute Resolution Comm. to Karen Engro, Chair of
the Pa. Bar Exam’rs (Oct. 21, 2009) (on file with the author).
198 See generally James J. Alfini, Settlement Ethics and Lawyering in ADR Proceedings: A
Proposal to Revise Rule 4.1, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255 (1999); Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
Professional Rules and ADR: Control of Alternative Dispute Resolution Under the ABA
Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal and Other Professional Responsibility Standards, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895 (2001); Kovach, supra note 10, at 935; Menkel-Meadow, Ethics of
ADR supra note 74, at 979; Yarn, supra note 74, at 213-17; James Alfini, E2K Leaves
Mediation in an Ethics “Black Hole,” DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2001, at 3; Kimberlee K.
Kovach, New Ethics for the New Lawyer: Fitting the Standards to the Process, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Winter 1997, at 2; Douglas Yarn & Wayne Thorpe, Ethics 2000: The ABA Proposes
New Ethics Rules for Lawyer-Neutrals and Attorneys in ADR, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring
2001, at 3.
199 See, e.g., Lande, supra note 96, at 69 (describing one approach to reform, involving use
of dispute system design principles to encourage good faith participation in court-connected
mediation and to handle allegations of lack of good faith).
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article did not begin as a morality story, but both the hypothetical
involving XYZ and the story of In re Skinner Engine Company represent cau-
tionary tales.  Dispute resolution procedures, like any other set of tools, have
the potential to be misused and even abused.  It is time, once again, for educa-
tion and reform.  Certainly, this will not be simple, and advocates likely will
need to get our hands uncomfortably dirty as we fight for the legitimacy and
virtue of dispute resolution.
Sometimes, it is difficult to understand how the fight can be so difficult
and why it recurs so frequently.  The value and appropriate use of dispute reso-
lution procedures can seem so simple (and pure)—like “motherhood and apple
pie.”  Despite their reputation, though, even motherhood (or, more accurately,
parenthood) and apple pie are neither simple nor pure.  They only look that way
after the fact, when the children are thriving and the dessert is proclaimed deli-
cious.  Let’s hope we experience similar success as we move to the next stage
in the evolution and integration of dispute resolution, even if part of the price is
insufficient acknowledgement of our work, doubts and pain.  The satisfaction
of knowing that we played our part may need to be reward enough.
